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All the ideas for 'Universals', 'Language,Truth and Logic' and 'works'

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59 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is a department of logic.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Personally I would invert that. Philosophy is concerned with human rationality, of which precise logic appears to be a rather limited subdivision. I see philosophy as the 'master' subject, not the 'servant' subject (as Locke had implied).
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: To T.H. Green an ideal was no creation of an idle imagination, metaphysics no mere play of the speculative reason. Ideals were the most solid, and metaphysics the most practical thing about a man.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I
     A reaction: This is despite the fact that Green was an idealist in the Hegelian tradition. I like this. I see it not just as ideals having practical guiding influence, but also that ideals themselves arising out of experience.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer]
     Full Idea: We can overthrow speculative philosophy, and see that the function of philosophy is wholly critical.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This seems to imply that we CAN speculate, which appeared to be rendered impossible by the verification principle. Personally I think speculation is central to philosophy, but Ayer should always stand as a warning against bogus truth-claims.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
     Full Idea: Thinkers from Hume to the logical positivists took exception to Kant's view that some synthetic propositions could be known a priori, and so rejected the possibility of metaphysics as Kant conceived of it.
     From: report of A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.1
     A reaction: See Idea 7918 for Kant's epistemological view of metaphysics. This strikes me as a big misunderstanding by empiricists, even though they are quite right to insist on evidence and proof. Metaphysics is essential, but its excess is the worst nonsense.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Critics say an analyst is obliged by his atomistic metaphysics to regard an object consisting of parts a, b, c and d in a distinctive configuration as being simply a+b+c+d, and thus giving an entirely false account of its nature.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Ayer refers the critics to gestatl psychology. Personally I prefer to talk about the ontology rather than the psychology. If we include (as Russell suggests) relations as part of the analysis, there seems to be no problem.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer]
     Full Idea: If there are any questions which science leaves it to philosophy to answer, a straightforward process of elimination must lead to their discovery.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is characteristic of the feeble-mindedness that British philosophy slipped into in the age of Wittgenstein, and for a while thereafter. Personally I regard scientists as servants, who are sent off on exploratory errands, and must report back.
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: When we speak of anything as true or false, we do so on the ground of its relation to a whole of organised knowledge existing actually in no human mind, but prefigured in every mind which is possessed of reason.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I n1
     A reaction: This seems to be the super-idealist view of the coherence account of truth. I have no idea what 'prefigured' means here.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer]
     Full Idea: When one says that "Queen Anne is dead" is true or false, these terms 'true' and 'false' connote nothing, but function in the sentence simply as marks of assertion and denial, so there is no sense in asking us to analyse the concept of 'truth'.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.5)
     A reaction: "I am ill" may be true when you say it, and false when I say it. The word 'true' has a useful function in 'x is true if y'. "If that is true, Freddie, I will hit you".
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The principles of logic and mathematics are true universally simply because we never allow them to be anything else; …in other words, they are analytic propositions, or tautologies.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This is obviously a very appealing idea, but it doesn's explain WHY we have invented these particular tautologies (which seem surprisingly useful). The 'science of patterns' can be empirical and a priori and useful (but not tautological).
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Positivists tend to be prejudiced against ontology, regarding very general questions about what sort of things exist either as meaningless, or as questions to be settled by stipulation.
     From: report of A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.4
     A reaction: So much the worse for positivists, because they are missing all the fun. I consider one of the central activities of philosophy to be speculating about explanations. Ontology is at the heart of what explanation aims at.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The whole theory of particulars and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of language.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.13)
     A reaction: [Fraser MacBride has pursued this idea] It is rather difficult to deny the existence of particulars, in the sense of actual objects, so this appears to make Ramsey a straightforward nominalist, of some sort or other.
We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The two obvious methods of abolishing the distinction between particulars and universals are by holding either that universals are collections of particulars, or that particulars are collections of their qualities.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.8)
     A reaction: Ramsey proposes an error theory, arising out of language. Quine seems to offer another attempt, making objects and predication unanalysable and basic. Abstract reference seems to make the strongest claim to separate out the universals.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: It seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two sentences 'Socrates is wise' and 'wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' assert the same fact and express the same proposition.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.12)
     A reaction: Could be challenged. One says Socrates is just the way he is, the other says he is attached to an abstract entity greater than himself. The squabble over universals has become a squabble over logical form. Finding logical form needs metaphysics!
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer]
     Full Idea: No proposition, other than a tautology, can possibly be anything more than a probable hypothesis.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: A nice clear empiricist rejection of all attempts to assert necessary truths about nature. This also seems to be a rejection of empiricist foundationalism. A problem case seems to be introspective observations, which seem irrefutable and obvious.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer]
     Full Idea: Logical positivist phenomenalism has few supporters these days; ..no one ever seemed clear what the sense-datum equivalent of 'there is a table in the next room' could be.
     From: comment on A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.4
     A reaction: But do the critics know what they mean by 'there is a table in the next room'? Does it just mean 'I am hoping there is'? You can't refer to the table in the next room without sticking your ontological neck out - and that is 'best explanation'.
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The existence of a material thing is defined in terms of the actual and possible occurrence of the sense-contents which constitute it as a logical construction.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Obviously we need 'possible' experiences so that unperceived trees can still exist, but it is a can of worms. Is speculation about a possible world an account of possible experiences? Realists want to know WHY we think certain experiences are possible.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: All knowledge is seen on ultimate analysis to rest upon the idea of a fundamental unity between subject and object, between the knower and that which there is to be known.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III
     A reaction: I don't really understand this thought, but I think it embodies the essence of Hegelian idealism. If I know a tree in the wood, any 'unity' between us strikes as merely imaginary. If the tree isn't separate, what does 'knowing' it mean?
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer]
     Full Idea: It is possible to challenge the proposition 'a material thing cannot be in two places at once' empirically; if you destroy one object, the other should also instantly be destroyed if they are a single thing.
     From: comment on A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2) by Virgil Ierubino - works
     A reaction: This leaves us having to decide whether the proposition is metaphysically necessary, or is empirical, or is tautological. This idea inclines me towards the view that it is empirical. Imagine two 'separate' objects which responded identically to stimuli.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Whether a geometry can be applied to the actual physical world or not, is an empirical question which falls outside the scope of the geometry itself.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This is a key objection to rationalism by empiricists. You may say that geometry applies to your car, but your car may have been pulverised while you were talking. Why, though, did Einstein find non-Euclidean geometry so useful?
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The proposition that 'a material thing cannot be in two places at once' is not empirical at all, but linguistic; ..we could so alter our definitions that the proposition came to express a self-contradiction instead of a necessary truth.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This seems a striking anticipation of Quine's famous challenge to the analytic/synthetic distinction.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer]
     Full Idea: To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This is Ayer's splendidly clearcut anti-rationalism. However, one might concede that one cannot know a priori about remote possible worlds (though I'm not so sure), but still claim a priori extrapolations from our current experiences.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Positivists prefer the sense-datum vocabulary because it is more inclusive than physical object vocabulary; it can report after-images, hallucinations, illusions and bodily sensations, as well as veridical perceptions.
     From: report of A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.4
     A reaction: The assumption of this is that illusions and perceptions are frequently indistinguishable, but that is just nonsense. Illusions usually appeal to one sense only, when you are ill, and in an unclear way. Sensible people know objects when they see them.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The fact that all causal and representative theories of perception treat material things as if they were unobservable entities entitles us to rule them out a priori.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
     A reaction: It seems to me that we can accept a causal/representative account of perception if we think of it in terms of 'best explanation' rather than observables. Explanation requires speculation, which logical positivists can't cope with.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The fundamental tenet of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Presumably one should add that thought gives synthetic knowledge. Thought is also an experience, so empiricists will always acknowledge that we could have some knowledge (of thought) by thought alone.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer]
     Full Idea: Ayer's gives an account of the a priori (as analytic) that readily meshes with empiricism, and empiricism had long been lacking an adequate account of the a priori
     From: comment on A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4
     A reaction: Ayer's logical positivist view was based on Hume's 'relations of ideas', as opposed to 'matters of fact'. Personally I see no reason why some facts about reality shouldn't be self-evident to thought, just as others are self-evident to the senses.
All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer]
     Full Idea: One way to attack a metaphysician would be to enquire from what premises his propositions were deduced. Must he not begin, as other men do, with the evidence of his senses?
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This simple idea is the core of empiricism. This is a heavily criticised doctrine, but you must start somewhere. Hume and Russell agreed. Don't forget, though, that Descartes's first move is to reject the senses as untrustworthy.
My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The empiricist doctrine to which we are committed is a logical doctrine concerning the distinction between analytic propositions, synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: This is the tough logical positivist version of empiricism. The whole project stumbles on the relationship between a synthetic proposition and its verifying experiences. How close? What of wild speculations? The analytic part is interesting, though.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer]
     Full Idea: It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is a wonderfull plain-spoken challenge to anyone who thinks they can demonstrate facts a priori about reality. 'I see this object in two places at once'? 'This object appears to be both red and green'?
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The objection which is commonly brought against empiricism is that it is impossible on empiricist principles to account for our knowledge of necessary truths.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This criticism goes back at least to Leibniz. Ayer's distinctive contribution to empiricism (with help) is to emphasise that we can only know necessities if they are tautologies. Hume always challenged our knowledge of natural necessities.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: Systematic interdependence in the world of nature is the ultimate test of truth.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Green (or Muirhead) drifts between coherence as the nature of truth and coherence as the nature of justification. He it is the 'test' for truth, which was Russell's view.
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The problem of induction is (roughly) finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalisations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to be the only problem. It seems self-evident (since Hume) that you cannot use deductive reasoning to prove that the future will be like the past. In fact, we should obviously be cautious, as things could easily change.
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer]
     Full Idea: It is often said that we can justify induction by invoking the uniformity of nature, but that principle merely states (in a misleading fashion) the assumption that past experience is a reliable guide to the future.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
     A reaction: That is correct, but it seems to me that if you take the uniformity of nature as a provisional unproven axiom, then induction is an account of how rational creatures cope with the situation. If nature ceases to be uniform, our reason cannot cope.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
     Full Idea: On the view that we are discussing, I must regard other people as metaphysical objects; for it is assumed that their experiences are completely inaccessible to my observation.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: 'Metaphysical' is here a dirty word. This is the strictly empirical view of other minds, which pushes Ayer towards behaviourism on this subject. He should have asked about the 'best explanation' of the behaviour of others'.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
     Full Idea: If I know that an object behaves in every way as a conscious being must, by definition, behave, then I know that it is really conscious. This is an analytical proposition.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: This treats the Turing test as proof of consciousness, and is open to all the usual objections to behaviourism. To say behaviour IS consciousness is ridiculous. It just counts as evidence. Presumably Ayer would later have become a functionalist.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The self, if it is not to be treated as a metaphysical entity, must be held to be a logical construction out of sense-experiences.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: It is striking how people differ in their reports when they try to see the self by introspection. The self could be beyond sense-experience, and yet still be the best explanation of what we actually DO experience. It is a 'transcendental sensation'?
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer]
     Full Idea: For any two sense-experiences to belong to the sense-history of the same self it is necessary and sufficient that they should contain organic sense-contents which are elements of the same body.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: This makes more sense if you are a realist about organic bodies, but less sense if (like Ayer) you define the body in terms of sense-experiences. It is a stab at what is now called 'animalism', but needs an account of brain transplant thought-experiments.
Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer]
     Full Idea: We have solved Hume's problem by defining personal identity in terms of bodily identity, and bodily identity is to be defined in terms of the resemblance and continuity of sense-contents.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: This is a phenomenalist account of personal identity, so it has no independent account of the body apart from the contents of the mind. Personally I think we must distinguish 'central' mental events from 'peripheral' ones.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The problems of bridging the 'gulf' between mind and matter, in knowledge or in action, are all fictitious problems arising out of the senseless metaphysical conception of mind and matter as 'substances'.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7)
     A reaction: He is presumably implying that there is only one 'substance', the stuff of physics, thus voting for Spinoza's dual aspect theory. There could still be a 'gulf', between incommensurable properties, or untranslatable levels of description.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer]
     Full Idea: A sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: 'I can't verify it, but I know a bloke who can'? 'If only I could think of a way to verify x'? 'This is unverifiable, but it is the only remaining possibility'? 'X is unverifiable, but it would nice if it was true'? Etc.
Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The mark of a genuinely factual proposition is that some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those premises alone.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I.Berlin showed that any statement S could pass this test, because if you assert 'S' and 'If S then O', these two statements entail O, which could be some random observation. Verificationism kept meeting problems of this kind.
Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This appears to be false. Possibly the problem is that Ayer takes the whole proposition to be the unit of meaning, but actually meaninfulness only requires that we build up a claim about a possible world from semantic units. Blue bees live on square suns.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Unless it is possible to provide some criterion by which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a proposition's validity.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6)
     A reaction: It is a bit much to expect a 'proof' of its 'validity'! If moral judgements are reflected in consequences, then reliable intuitions (i.e. wisdom) could be demonstrated by getting it right (for happiness, or flourishing).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: All that is distinctively human in the life of man springs not from the desire to possess this or that object, and so far to realise a better, but to be something more and better than he is.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: An example of Victorian optimism, I think. I'm guessing that people who are not motivated by this impulse are not behaving in a way that is 'distinctively human'. That said, this is an interesting aspect of human nature.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
     Full Idea: Ayer defends emotivism, which is his own favoured form of expressivism.
     From: report of A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 2.1
     A reaction: A helpful distinction of terminology. Expressivism is the broad theory, and emotivism is a sub-type, saying that it is emotions which are expressed. The alternative (such as Prescriptivism) is to express pro- and con- attitudes.
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
     Full Idea: In adding 'You acted wrongly in…' to 'you stole my money' I am not making any further statement about it; I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6)
     A reaction: A basic claim of emotivism. Perhaps an understandable response to (e.g.) Kantian claims that we have duties, but to no one in particular. Most people mean by moral criticism that there will be long-term bad consequences, or virtue is lacking.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: Hedonism failed because it offered as an end of human aspiration an object in which the human spirit, pledged by its own nature to self-betterment, …could never find satisfaction.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: It is always both sad and amusing to see that 150 years ago someone wrote of a doctrine that is still with us that it has 'failed'. Nowadays they try to say the same of physicalism. His objection rests on optimism about humanity.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: Where laws and institutions are apparently the work of deliberate volition, they are in reality the result of a compromise, which while by a kind of social contract it has the acquiescence of all, expresses the will of none.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III
     A reaction: Politicians who claim to be enacting the 'will of the people' (e.g. when they won a referendum 52-48) are simply lying. Committees usually end up enacting one person's will, but often without realising what has happened.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: With all seriousness and reverence we may hope and pray for a condition of English society in which all honest citizens will recognise themselves and be recognised by each other as gentlemen.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV
     A reaction: Call me old fashioned but, as long as we expand this to include ladies, I like this thought. Chaucer's knight (in his Prologue) should be our national role model. The true gentleman is an Aristotelian ideal.
Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: Enfranchisement of the people is an end in itself. …Only citizenship makes the moral man; only citizenship gives that respect which is the true basis of the respect for others.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii:436), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV
     A reaction: Should people respect their betters? If so, that is a sort of deferential respect which is different from the mutual respect between equals. That said, I wholly approve of this idea.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: The modern idea of the good has developed in respect of the range of persons who have the capacity and therefore the right to participate in this good.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Green is a notable Victorian liberal, starting from an idealist metaphysics. This is an intriguing view of liberal values. The concept of the good should be what suits persons with full capacity. Having the capacity bestows the right of access to it. Hm.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: In so far as society commits itself to the principle of individuality of its citizens does it realise the unity and stability that constitute it a true 'State'.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: This asserts the liberal vision of a state, rather than asserting a fact. A state consistently mostly of slaves still seems to be a state, and may achieve a lot.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: In so far as the individual commits himself to the principle of co-operation in a social whole does he realise his end as individual personality.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: This makes for a very communitarian type of liberalism. The question is whether we create insitutions which suck our free citizens into a communal way of life, or whether that is a matter of their own initiative.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: To anyone who understands a process of development, the result being developed is the reality; and it is its ability to become this that the subject undergoing development has its true nature.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii: 224), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Although this contains the dubious Hegelian idea that development tends towards some 'end', presented as fixed and final, it still seems important that anything accepted as a 'development' is the expression of some natural potential.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: God is a subject which is eternally all that the self-conscious subject as developed in time has the possibility of becoming.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I
     A reaction: [Ethics p.197] Reminiscent of Peirce's account of truth, as the ideal end of enquiry. If God is a human ideal, we either limit God, or exaggerate our powers of idealisation.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The notion of a person whose essential attributes are non-empirical is not an intelligible notion at all.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Non-empirical and non-causal are not quite the same thing. A being which never had any effects is a bizarre, and probably pointless, fantasy. A being which affected our world (through ideas, say) but is unobservable is a perfectly good theory.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer]
     Full Idea: When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is an unsurprising endorsement from logical positivism that Kant's claim that the ontological argument is probably tautological is correct. We could of course say "Imagine a non-existent being with dirty toenails".
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: God is identical with the self of every man in the sense of being the realisation of its determinate possibilities.…In being conscious of himself man is conscious of God and thus knows that God is, but only in so far as he knows what he himself really is.
     From: T.H. Green (works [1875], iii:226-7), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: Does this, by the transitivity of identity, imply the identity of all individual men? Do we all contain identical possibilities, which converge on a unified concept of God? I always take the monotheistic God to far exceed mere human possibilities.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer]
     Full Idea: If the assertion that there is a god is non-sensical, then the atheist's assertion that there is no god is equally non-sensical.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Ayer urgently needs the concept of 'best explanation'. If we observe only footprints, we infer creatures; if there are no footprints, lack of creatures looks like a good theory. The design argument is perfectly meaningful.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / c. Religious Verification
The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer]
     Full Idea: There cannot be any transcendent truths of religion, for the sentences which the theist uses to express such 'truths' are not literally significant.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Ayer claims that only tautologies or empirically verifiable statements have literal significance. I say speculations, wild theories and fantasies are perfectly meaningful. Nevertheless, the words of many hymns and prayers look like empty rhetoric.