Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Probability', 'Consistency and realism (with 1972 note)' and 'The Methods of Ethics (7th edn)'

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7 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
13766 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
     Full Idea: Ramsey suggested that 'if', 'given that' and 'on the supposition that' come to the same thing, and that the degrees of belief in the antecedent should then conform to probability theory.
     From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Frank P. Ramsey - Law and Causality B
     A reaction: [compressed]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
19143 Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson]
     Full Idea: Ramsey gave an axiomatic treatment of preference in the face of uncertainty, when applied to a particular agent.
     From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2
     A reaction: This is evidently the beginnings of Bayesian decision theory.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
23111 If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick]
     Full Idea: If we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say that it is by free choice that he acts irrationally.
     From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], p.511), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 7.4
     A reaction: A very nice riposte. Clearly people can rationally choose to act irrationally, e.g. at a wild party.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22454 We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Williams argued that we can tolerate inconsistency in moral principles though not in assertions, and that this is explained by the fact that it is the concern of the latter but not of the former to reflect an 'independent order of things'.
     From: report of Bernard Williams (Consistency and realism (with 1972 note) [1966]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.37
     A reaction: Put like this, Williams seems to beg the question, which is whether there is an independent moral order to things. There seems to be an easy answer, which is that we are only intolerant of inconsistency when we are confident about it.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23059 Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray]
     Full Idea: Sidgwick said self-interest is not self-evidently rational. Unless we invoke a religious idea of the soul, human personality is no more than a succession of continuities in memory and behaviour. In that case, why should anyone favour their future self?
     From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by John Gray - Seven Types of Atheism 2
     A reaction: This sounds like Locke's account of the self, as psychological continuity. We can say that our continuous self is a fiction, the hero of our own narrative. Personally I think of the self as a sustained set of brains structures which change very little.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
4129 It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick]
     Full Idea: It is a self-evident principle that the good of one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the Universe, than the good of any other, ..and as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part.
     From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], III.XIII.3)
     A reaction: Showing that even a very empirical theory like utilitarianism has an a priori basis. Of course, the principle is false. What about animals, the senile, criminals, androids? What bestows 'importance'?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
20588 Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf]
     Full Idea: Sidgwick's complex version of utilitarianism urges that institutions should be set in place to maximise utility, but that individual actions people undertake might not appear to be justifiable on utilitarian terms.
     From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 1 Refs
     A reaction: This seems to be a specifically political version of utilitarianism, but isn't cited much by political philosophers who discuss utilitarianism.