Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Probability', 'Of Grammatology' and 'Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals

13766	'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
	Full Idea: Ramsey suggested that 'if', 'given that' and 'on the supposition that' come to the same thing, and that the degrees of belief in the antecedent should then conform to probability theory.
	From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Frank P. Ramsey - Law and Causality B
	A reaction: [compressed]

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

19143	Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson]
	Full Idea: Ramsey gave an axiomatic treatment of preference in the face of uncertainty, when applied to a particular agent.
	From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2
	A reaction: This is evidently the beginnings of Bayesian decision theory.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity

21929	Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida]
	Full Idea: Derrida affirms something like an 'ambiguity of meaning'. But he explicitly contrasts the word he uses to characterize the phenomenon at issue, what he calls 'dissemination', with the traditional concept of 'polysemia' - multiple meanings.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology [1967]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 2 'After'
	A reaction: The point, I presume, is that there is vagueness and elision to the meanings, rather than a list of options, such as bank/bank. Context (sense-making paths) is crucial for Derrida. Can the analytic apparatus for the logic of vagueness be brought to bear?

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

7634	Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
	Full Idea: For Peirce there are three different kinds of sign, which are different kinds of representation, built on different relationships: an 'icon' represents what it resembles, an 'index' is a natural sign, and a 'symbol' is a conventional sign.
	From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs [1897]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.4
	A reaction: Maund makes use of natural signs (like footprints) to explain representative perception. Peirce's distinctions seem useful in philosophy of mind generally, if the brain somehow represents what it experiences. How subjective are signs?