Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universals', 'There is No A Priori (and reply)' and 'Manuscript remains'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: No one who is religious attains to philosophy; he does not need it. No one who really philosophizes is religious; he walks without leading-strings, perilously but free.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], II p.241-3), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is a direct reply to the opposite view expressed by Schleiermacher (and quoted by Lewis). I would say that to be a philosopher one must give priority to the philosophy, ahead of any religious beliefs. Thinking must be free.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The whole theory of particulars and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of language.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.13)
     A reaction: [Fraser MacBride has pursued this idea] It is rather difficult to deny the existence of particulars, in the sense of actual objects, so this appears to make Ramsey a straightforward nominalist, of some sort or other.
We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The two obvious methods of abolishing the distinction between particulars and universals are by holding either that universals are collections of particulars, or that particulars are collections of their qualities.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.8)
     A reaction: Ramsey proposes an error theory, arising out of language. Quine seems to offer another attempt, making objects and predication unanalysable and basic. Abstract reference seems to make the strongest claim to separate out the universals.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: It seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two sentences 'Socrates is wise' and 'wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' assert the same fact and express the same proposition.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.12)
     A reaction: Could be challenged. One says Socrates is just the way he is, the other says he is attached to an abstract entity greater than himself. The squabble over universals has become a squabble over logical form. Finding logical form needs metaphysics!
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
     Full Idea: What non-experiential link to reality could support insights into its necessary character?
     From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 4)
     A reaction: The key to it, I think, is your theory of mind. If you are a substance dualist, then connecting to such deep things looks fine, but if you are a reductive physicalist then it looks absurdly hopeful.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
     Full Idea: It is overwhelmingly plausible that some knowledge is empirical. The attractive thesis of naturalism is that all knowledge is; there is only one way of knowing.
     From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 1)
     A reaction: How many ways for us to know seems to depend on what faculties we have. We lump our senses together under a single heading. The arrival of data is not the same as the arrival of knowledge. I'm unconvinced that naturalists like me must accept this.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: As the subject of willing I am an exceedingly wretched being, and all our suffering consistd in willing, ...but as soon as I am absorbed in knowledge, I am blissfully happy and nothing can assail me.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.137), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: So the source of his pessimism is subjection to his own will. However, since becoming absorbed in knowledge is an easy task for a scholar, he has little to grumble about. Nietzsche mocked the great pessimist for playing the flute every day.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: To deduce from reason [Vernunft] the moral element in conduct is blasphemy. In this element there is expressed the better consciousness which lies far above all reason. expresses itself in conduct as holiness, and is the true salvation of the world.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.47), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: Aimed at Kant. Only Plato could inspire a non-religious person to write about morality is such terms. Maybe also the stoic ideal of beautiful deeds (given the supreme value Schopenhauer placed on the arts).