7 ideas
3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: It is evident that "It is true that Caesar was murdered" means no more than that Caesar was murdered. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927]) | |
A reaction: At the very least, saying it is true adds emphasis. One sentence is about Caesar, the other about a proposal concerning Caesar, so they can't quite be the same. Note Frege's priority in making this suggestion. |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation. | |
From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397) | |
A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms. |
18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927], p.51), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought | |
A reaction: I find this idea quite bizarre. Most sentences have no connection to any action or behavior at all. Do we have to ingeniously contrive some possible action? That is the worst sort of behaviourism. See context - Ramsey wasn't stupid! |
23674 | If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid] |
Full Idea: If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people. |
23675 | We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid] |
Full Idea: It is a first principle of morals, that we ought not to do to another what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 6) | |
A reaction: This negative form of the rule is more plausible than the positive form, presumably because there is more consensus about what we all dislike than what we all prefer. But presents for people that they would like, not that you like. |
23672 | To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid] |
Full Idea: A man cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: Thus are Aristotle and Kant united in a simple sentence. Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person thereby sees what is the right thing to do, but I take 'duty' to imply a requirement which comes not from good character but from external society. |
23673 | Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid] |
Full Idea: I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy! |