Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'The Theory of Logical Types' and 'On Plural Reference and Set Theory'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell]
     Full Idea: By a 'propositional function' I mean something which contains a variable x, and expresses a proposition as soon as a value is assigned to x. That is to say, it differs from a proposition solely by the fact that it is ambiguous.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.216)
     A reaction: This is Frege's notion of a 'concept', as an assertion of a predicate which still lacks a subject.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack]
     Full Idea: Helen Cartwright calls 'a number of' a 'singulariser', an expression whose linguistic function is to convert to a syntactically neutral form an expression whose semantic value remains plural. It is a great convenience grammatically.
     From: report of Helen Cartwright (On Plural Reference and Set Theory [1993]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 2
     A reaction: Compare Hofweber's Idea 10004, suggesting it is a crucial psychological convenience for reasoning, as well as a 'grammatical' convenience.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell]
     Full Idea: Such a proposition as 'all the judgements made by Epimenedes are true' will only be prima facie capable of truth if all his judgements are of the same order.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.227)
     A reaction: This is an attempt to use his theory of types to solve the Liar. Tarski's invocation of a meta-language is clearly in the same territory.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell]
     Full Idea: Russell's theory of types meant that features common to different levels of the hierarchy became uncapturable (since any attempt to capture them would involve a predicate which disobeyed the hierarchy restrictions).
     From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2H
     A reaction: I'm not clear whether this is the main reason why type theory was abandoned. Ramsey was an important critic.
Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey]
     Full Idea: In Russell's mature 1910 theory of types classes are defined in terms of propositional functions, and functions themselves are regimented by a ramified theory of types mitigated by the axiom of reducibility.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.133
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell]
     Full Idea: We will define a function of one variable as 'predicative' when it is of the next order above that of its arguments, i.e. of the lowest order compatible with its having an argument.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.237)
     A reaction: 'Predicative' just means it produces a set. This is Russell's strict restriction on which functions are predicative.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
     Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
     From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.