Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'The Analysis of Mind' and 'What is Mathematical Truth?'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
19347 Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
     Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
     From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
10269 Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Mathematics has got rid of possibility by simply assuming that, up to isomorphism anyway, all possibilities are simultaneous actual - actual, that is, in the universe of 'sets'.
     From: Hilary Putnam (What is Mathematical Truth? [1975], p.70), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.5
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6417 In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: In 'The Analysis of Mind' Russell gave up talk of 'sense-data', and ceased to distinguish between the act of sensing and what is sensed.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This seems to lead towards the modern 'adverbial' account of sensing, where I don't sense 'data', but where qualia (such as redness) are our particular mode of directly perceiving objects, where insects might directly perceive them in a different mode.
6474 Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
     Full Idea: Undeniably, knowledge comes through seeing, but it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as knowledge; if we are so to regard it, we must distinguish the seeing from what is seen; a patch of colour is one thing, and our seeing it is another.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
     A reaction: This is Russell's 1921 explanation of why he adopted sense-data (but he rejects them later in this paragraph). This gives a simplistic impression of what he intended, which has three components: the object, the 'sensibile', and the sense-datum.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6476 We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
     Full Idea: If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world; but when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
     A reaction: This is the reason why Russell himself rejected sense-data. It is more normal, I think, to reject them simply as being superfluous. If the subject can simply perceive the sense-data, why can't they just perceive the object more directly?
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2792 It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
     Full Idea: There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], p.159)
     A reaction: One of the great sceptical arguments! At a stroke it undermines forever any dreams that memories are totally certain. This is an extra scepticism, which arises if you decide that current experience IS totally certain.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
22326 Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
     Full Idea: Accuracy of response to stimulus does not alone show knowledge, but must be reinforced by appropriateness, i.e. suitability of realising one's purpose.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], p.261), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 66 'Rel'
     A reaction: The aim of 'realising one's purpose' puts a very pragmatist spin on this. The point is a good one, and seems to apply particularly to Nozick's accurate 'tracking' account of knowledge.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
6475 In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
     Full Idea: In perception, the idea of the subject appears to be a logical fiction, like mathematical points and instants; it is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
     A reaction: In 1912, Russell had felt that both the Cogito, and the experience of meta-thought, had confirmed the existence of a non-permanent ego, but here he offers a Humean rejection. His notion of a 'logical fiction' is behaviouristic. I believe in the Self.