Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'poems (frags)' and 'Aristotle on Matter'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition

12302	Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4)
	A reaction: I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end?

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia

14266	Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: For us, sets constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm. But for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1 n4)
	A reaction: Genus and differentia are only part of the story in Aristotle, and this remarks strikes me as perceptive. It is precisely the mapping of the explanatory hierarchy which Aristotle seeks in a good definition.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

14268	Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It may be that the two forms of grounding have a different source; the one from the bottom up is required for the constitution of the thing to be intelligible; the one from the top down is required for the essence of the thing to be intelligible.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 2)
	A reaction: [He cites Aristotle Met. 1019a8-10 in support] Close reading of Fine would be needed to elucidate this properly, but it is a suggestive line of thought about how we should approach grounding.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

19347	Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
	Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
	From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
	A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

14267	There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach.

14264	Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

3015	The virtue of man is thoughtful foresight of future events [Chilo, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: A foresight of future events, such as could be arrived at by consideration, is the virtue of man.
	From: report of Chilo (poems (frags) [c.490 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.4.1

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter

14265	The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If one considers Aristotle's standard example of a definition, then it is plausible that its defining terms ('plane figure' in the case of a circle) should be constitutive of it in the same general way as physical matter constitutes something physical.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: It strikes me that an appropriate translation for the Greek 'hule' might be the English 'ingredients', since Fine seems to be right about the broad application of hule in Aristotle.