Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'There Are No Abstract Objects' and 'The Emergence of Probability'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking]
     Full Idea: Gassendi is the first in the great line of empiricist philosophers that gradually came to dominate European thought.
     From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Epicurus, of course, was clearly an empiricist. British readers should note that Gassendi was not British.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
     Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims.
     From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1)
     A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
     Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect.
     From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
     A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
     Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
     From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
     Full Idea: If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities.
     From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
     A reaction: This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly).
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
     Full Idea: Probability has two aspects: the degree of belief warranted by evidence, and the tendency displayed by some chance device to produce stable relative frequencies. These are the epistemological and statistical aspects of the subject.
     From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.1)
     A reaction: The most basic distinction in the subject. Later (p.124) he suggests that the statistical form (known as 'aleatory' probability) is de re, and the other is de dicto.
Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
     Full Idea: There is hardly any history of probability to record before Pascal (1654), and the whole subject is very well understood after Laplace (1812).
     From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.1)
     A reaction: An interesting little pointer on the question of whether the human race is close to exhausting all the available intellectual problems. What then?
Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
     Full Idea: Epistemological probability is torn between Keynes etc saying it depends on the strength of logical implication, and Ramsey etc saying it is personal judgement which is subject to strong rules of internal coherence.
     From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.2)
     A reaction: See Idea 7449 for epistemological probability. My immediate intuition is that the Ramsey approach sounds much more plausible. In real life there are too many fine-grained particulars involved for straight implication to settle a probability.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
     Full Idea: In the medieval view, evidence short of deduction was not really evidence at all.
     From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Hacking says the modern concept of evidence comes with probability in the 17th century. That might make it one of the most important ideas ever thought of, allowing us to abandon certainties and live our lives in a more questioning way.
Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
     Full Idea: In the medieval view, people provided the evidence of testimony and of authority. What was lacking was the seventeenth century idea of the evidence provided by things.
     From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.4)
     A reaction: A most intriguing distinction, which seems to imply a huge shift in world-view. The culmination of this is Peirce's pragmatism, in Idea 6948, of which I strongly approve.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG]
     Full Idea: An experiment is a test (if T, then E implies R, so try E, and if R follows, T seems right), an adventure (no theory, but try things), a diagnosis (reading the signs), or a dissection (taking apart).
     From: report of Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.4) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice analysis. The Greeks did diagnosis, then the alchemists tried adventures, then Vesalius began dissections, then the followers of Bacon concentrated on the test, setting up controlled conditions. 'If you don't believe it, try it yourself'.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
     Full Idea: Mathematics is the model for reasoning about necessary truths, but jurisprudence must be our model when we deliberate about contingencies.
     From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.10)
     A reaction: Interesting. Certainly huge thinking, especially since the Romans, has gone into the law, and creating rules of evidence. Maybe all philosophers should study law and mathematics?