3 ideas
| 5042 | For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Nothing ever takes place without its being possible for one who knew everything to give some reason why it should have happened rather than not. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter on Freedom [1689], p.112) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there will be GOOD reason why genocide occurs. Note that there is a reason for every 'event'. Is there a reason for every truth? Presumably not, or there would have to be reasons for self-evident truths. |
| 19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
| Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates. | |
| From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that. |
| 23803 | States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Dennett, by Schulte] |
| Full Idea: Dennett maintains that a system has states with representational content if we are able to predict its behaviour reliably and voluminously by adopting the intentional stance toward it. | |
| From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (True Believers [1981]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 5 | |
| A reaction: Dennett himself seems happy to thereby attribute representational content to a chess-playing computer. This sounds like a test for content, rather than explaining what it is. Not promising, I think. |