Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Causation' and 'Necessary Truth'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

19347	Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
	Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
	From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
	A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

4577	There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
	Full Idea: In principle I see no higher or more austere necessity than natural necessity; and in natural necessity, or our attribution of it, I see only Hume's regularities
	From: Willard Quine (Necessary Truth [1963], p.76)
	A reaction: Presumably this allows logical necessity as a 'lower' necessity, but denies 'metaphysical' necessity, in line with Hume and other tough empiricists. Personally I adore metaphysical necessities, but they are a bit hard to establish conclusively.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

8406	Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
	Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally.
	From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79)
	A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

8407	A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
	Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth.
	From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82)
	A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity.