Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Experience First (and reply)' and 'Morality, Action, and Outcome'

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10 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
19347 Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
     Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
     From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: The proposition that understanding does not involve knowledge is widespread (for example, in discussions of what philosophy aims at), but hardly withstands scrutiny. If you do not know how a jet engine works, you do not understand how it works.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.24)
     A reaction: This seems a bit disingenuous. As in 'Theaetetus', knowing the million parts of a jet engine is not to understand it. More strongly - how could knowledge of an infinity of separate propositional truths amount to understanding on their own?
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: An essential prerequisite for useful discussion of the relation between knowledge and understanding is systematic explicitness about what is to be known or understood.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.25)
     A reaction: This is better. I say what needs to be known for understanding is the essence of the item under discussion (my PhD thesis!). Obviously understanding needs some knowledge, but I take it that epistemology should be understanding-first. That is the main aim.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: If we say our cognitive aim is to get knowledge, the opposing views are the naturalistic view that what matters is just true belief (or just 'getting by'), or that there are rival epistemic goods such as understanding and wisdom.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.17)
     A reaction: [compressed summary] I'm a fan of understanding. The accumulation of propositional knowledge would relish knowing the mass of every grain of sand on a beach. If you say the propositions should be 'important', other values are invoked.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.
22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.
22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
     Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
     A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
22470 A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
     Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104)
     A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
22468 Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
     Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
     A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
22469 Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
     Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
     A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group.