9 ideas
| 7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes contended that the whole idea of materialism is somehow empty, on the grounds that there is no proper way to characterize the 'physical' realm. | |
| From: report of DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.1 | |
| A reaction: [Papineau also cites Gabriel Segal] I agree with Papineau in rejecting this. Uncertainties about quantum states do not pose a problem, and the position tends to have an implicit dualism buried in it somewhere. |
| 19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
| Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates. | |
| From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that. |
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Evidentialism does not support beginning epistemology by taking for granted that evidentialism is true. ...Rather, what potentially justifies belief in intial epistemic data and initial procedures of inquiry is the evidence itself. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |
| A reaction: This sounds good. I much prefer talk of 'evidence' to talk of 'perceptions', because evidence has been licked into shape, and its significance has been clarified. That is the first step towards the coherence we seek. |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Reliabilism would count pure guesses as good reasons if guessing were properly reliable. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |
| A reaction: See D.H. Lawrence's short story 'The Rocking Horse Winner'. This objection strikes me as being so devastating that it is almost conclusive. Except that pure guesses are never ever reliable, over a decent period of time. |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| Full Idea: Sheer reliability does not justify belief. ...It may be, for instance, that we have strong though misleading reason to deny the method's reliability. | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Circles') | |
| A reaction: That is, we accept a justification if we judge the method to be reliable, not if it IS reliable. I can disbelieve all the reliable information that arrives in my mind. People do that all the time! Hatred of experts! Support for internalism? |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
| Full Idea: An unrefined reliability theory does a poor job at capturing reflective judgements about hypothetical cases | |
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Stroud's') | |
| A reaction: Reliability can only be a test for tried and tested ways. No one can say whether imagining a range of possibilities is reliable or not. Is prediction a reliable route to knowledge? |
| 6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
| Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic. | |
| From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194) | |
| A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north? |
| 6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
| Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them. | |
| From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198) | |
| A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist. |
| 6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
| Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science. | |
| From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203) | |
| A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist? |