25 ideas
7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Donnellan objects that Russell's theory of definite descriptions overlooks the referential use (Russell writes as if all descriptions are used attributively), and that Strawson assumes they are all used referentially, to draw attention to things. | |
From: report of Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
A reaction: This seems like a nice little success for analytical philosophy - clarifying a horrible mess by making a simple distinction that leaves everyone happy. |
5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
Full Idea: A definite description may also be used non-referentially, even as it occurs in one and the same sentence. | |
From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §I) | |
A reaction: Donnellan says we have to know about the particular occasion on which the description is used, as in itself it will not achieve reference. "Will the last person out switch off the lights" achieves its reference at the end of each day. |
5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
Full Idea: A speaker who uses a definite description 'attributively' in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so; a speaker who uses it 'referentially' enables his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about. | |
From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §III) | |
A reaction: "Smith's murderer is insane" exemplifies the first use before he is caught, and the second use afterwards. The gist is that reference is not a purely linguistic activity, but is closer to pointing at something. This seems right. |
5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
Full Idea: For Russell there is a logical entailment: 'the x is F' entails 'there exists one and only one x'. Whether or not this is true of the attributive use of definite descriptions, it does not seem true of the referential use. The existence is a presumption. | |
From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §VI) | |
A reaction: Can we say 'x does not exist, but x is F'? Strictly, that sounds to me more like a contradiction than a surprising rejection of a presumption. However, 'Father Xmas does not exist, but he has a red coat'. |
16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
Full Idea: Beyond the entities there are certain real 'modes', which are positive, and in their own right act on those entities, giving them something that is outside their whole essence as individuals existing in reality. | |
From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.1.17), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
A reaction: Suárez is apparently the first person to formulate a proper account of properties as 'modes' of a thing, rather than as accidents which are separate, or are wholly integrated into a thing. A typical compromise proposal in philosophy. Can modes act? |
16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
Full Idea: The inherence of quantity is called its mode, because it affects that quantity, which serves to ultimately determine the state and character of its existence, but does not add to it any new proper entity, but only modifies the preexisting entity. | |
From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.1.17), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
A reaction: He seems to present mode as a very active thing, like someone who gives it a coat of paint, or hammers it into a new shape. I don't see how a 'mode' can have any ontological status at all. To exist, there has to be some way to exist. |
16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In the view of Suárez, substances are radically incomplete entities that cannot exist at all until determined in various ways by things of another kind, modes. …Modes are regarded as completers for their subjects. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
A reaction: This is correct. In order to be a piece of clay it needs a shape, a mass, a colour etc. Treating clay as an object independently from its shape is a misunderstanding. |
19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates. | |
From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that. |
17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
Full Idea: A form is required that, as it were, rules over all those faculties and accidents, and is the source of all actions and natural motions of such a being, and in which the whole variety of accidents and powers has its root and unity. | |
From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4 | |
A reaction: Pasnau emphasises that this is scholastics giving a very physical and causal emphasis to forms, which made them vulnerable to doubts among the new experiment physicists. Pasnau says forms are 'metaphysical', following Leibniz. |
16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
Full Idea: In a tree the part of the form that is in the leaf is not the same character as the part that is in the fruit., but yet they are partial forms, and apt to be united ….to compose one complete form of the whole. | |
From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.10.30), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.6 | |
A reaction: This is a common scholastic view, the main opponent of which was Aquinas, who says each thing only has one form. Do leaves have different DNA from the bark or the fruit? Presumably not (since I only have one DNA), which supports Aquinas. |
16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
Full Idea: The most powerful arguments establishing substantial forms are based on the necessity, for the perfect constitution of a natural being, that all the faculties and operations of that being are rooted in one essential principle. | |
From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.10.64), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4 | |
A reaction: Note Idea 15756, that this stability not only applies to biological entities (the usual Aristotelian examples), but also to non-living natural kinds. We might say that the drive for survival is someone united around a single entity. |
16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
Full Idea: We can say that the form that gives corporeal bulk [molem] or extension to things is the essential nature of quantity. To have bulk is to expel a similar bulk from the same space. | |
From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.4.16), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 539 | |
A reaction: This is one step away from asking why, once we knew the bulk and extension of the thing, we would still have any interest in trying to grasp something called its 'quantity'. |
16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
Full Idea: We can almost never set out the essences of things, as they are in things. Instead, we work through their connection to some non-essential feature, and we seem to succeed well enough when we spell it out through the feature closest to the essence. | |
From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.4.16), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5 | |
A reaction: It is a common view that with geometrical figures we can actually experience the essence itself. So has science broken through, and discerned actual essences of things? |
22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: To be really the same excludes being really other, but does not exclude being other modally or mentally. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.65) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
A reaction: So the statue and the clay are identical, but they could become separate, or be imagined as separate. |
22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The Real Essential distinction says if A and B are not of the same natural kind, then they are essentially distinct. This is the highest degree of distinction. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
A reaction: Boulter says Peter is essentially distinct from a cabbage, because neither has the nature of the other. |
22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The Minor Real distinction is if A can exist without B, but B ceases to exist without A. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
A reaction: This is one-way independence. Boulter's example is Peter and Peter's actual weight. |
22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The Major Real distinction is if A can exist in the real order without B, and B can exist in the real order without A. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
A reaction: Boulter's example is the distinction between Peter and Paul, where their identity of kind is irrelevant. This is two-way independence. |
22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The Conceptual or Mental distinction is when A and B are actually identical but we have two different ways of conceiving them. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
A reaction: This is the Morning and Evening Star. I bet Frege never read Suarez. This seems to be Spinoza's concept of mind/body. |
22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The Modal distinction is when A is not B or a property of B, but still could not possibly exist without B. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
A reaction: Duns Scotus proposed in, Ockham rejected it, but Suarez supports it. Suarez proposes that light's dependence on the Sun is distinct from the light itself, in this 'modal' way. |
22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The scholastic view is that Actuality is our only guide to possibility in the real order. One knows that it is possible to separate A and B if one knows that A and B have actually been separated or are separate. | |
From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
A reaction: It may be possible to separate A and B even though it has never happened, but it is hard to see how we could know that. (But if I put my pen down where it has never been before, I know I can pick it up again, even though this has not previously happened). |
10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: Donnellan argued that we could recognize a referential use of a definite description 'the F' by the fact that the speaker could thereby refer to something which is not F. | |
From: report of Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5 | |
A reaction: If the expression employed achieved reference whether the speaker wanted it to or not, it would certainly look as if the expression was inherently referring. |
10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
Full Idea: Donnellan seems to be unsure whether to regard his referential-attributive distinction as indicating a semantic ambiguity or merely a pragmatic one. | |
From: comment on Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L1 | |
A reaction: I vote for pragmatic. In a single brief conversation a definite description could start as attributive and end as referential, but it seems unlikely that its semantics changed in mid-paragraph. |
5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
Full Idea: If I think the king is a usurper, "Is the king in his counting house?" succeeds in referring to the right man, even though I do not believe that he fits the description. | |
From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §IV) | |
A reaction: This seems undeniable. If I point at someone, I can refer successfully with almost any description. "Oy! Adolf! Get me a drink!" Reference is an essential aspect of language, and it is not entirely linguistic. |
5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
Full Idea: Whether or not a definite description is used referentially or attributively is a function of the speaker's intentions in a particular case. | |
From: Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §VII) | |
A reaction: Donnellan's distinction, and his claim here, seem to me right. However words on a notice could refer on one occasion, and just describe on another. "Anyone entering this cage is mad". |
16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |
Full Idea: An angelic substance could be penetrated by other bodies in the same location. | |
From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.2.21), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.3 | |
A reaction: So am I co-located with an angel right now? |