Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Hilbert's Programme' and 'Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
17807 To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry]
     Full Idea: In the study of formal systems we do not confine ourselves to the derivation of elementary propositions step by step. Rather we take the system, defined by its primitive frame, as datum, and then study it by any means at our command.
     From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'The formalist')
     A reaction: This is what may potentially lead to an essentialist view of such things. Focusing on bricks gives formalism, focusing on buildings gives essentialism.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17809 Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel]
     Full Idea: Usually Gödel's incompleteness theorems are taken as showing a limitation on the syntactic approach to an understanding of the concept of infinity.
     From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 05)
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
17810 The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel]
     Full Idea: It is necessary to use non-mathematical concepts, i.e. concepts lacking the precision which permit mathematical manipulation, for a significant approach to foundations. We currently have no concepts of this kind which we can take seriously.
     From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 06)
     A reaction: Music to the ears of any philosopher of mathematics, because it means they are not yet out of a job.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
17806 It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
     Full Idea: According to realism, mathematical propositions express the most general properties of our physical environment. This is the primitive view of mathematics, yet on account of the essential role played by infinity in mathematics, it is untenable today.
     From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'The problem')
     A reaction: I resist this view, because Curry's view seems to imply a mad metaphysics. Hilbert resisted the role of the infinite in essential mathematics. If the physical world includes its possibilities, that might do the job. Hellman on structuralism?
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17808 Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry]
     Full Idea: To say that mathematics is logic is merely to replace one undefined term by another.
     From: Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'Mathematics')
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
19347 Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
     Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
     From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
17811 The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel]
     Full Idea: In analysis, the most natural conception of a point ignores the matter of naming the point, i.e. how the real number is represented or by what constructions the point is reached from given points.
     From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 13)
     A reaction: This problem has bothered me. There are formal ways of constructing real numbers, but they don't seem to result in a name for each one.