Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Letters to Thomasius' and 'Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

19347	Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
	Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
	From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
	A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects

13432	The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The essence of a circle consists in the equality of all lines drawn from its centre to its circumference.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669)
	A reaction: Compare Locke in Idea 13431 and Spinoza in Idea 13073 on the essence of geometrical figures. A key question is whether the essence is in the simplest definition, or in a complex and wide-ranging account, e.g. including conic sections for circles.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue

5121	Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman]
	Full Idea: Basing ethics on human flourishing tends towards utilitarianism or consequentialism; actions, character traits, laws, and so on are to be assessed with reference to their contributions to human flourishing.
	From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.2)
	A reaction: This raises the question of whether only virtue can contribute to flourishing, or whether a bit of vice might be helpful. This problem presumably pushed the Stoics to say that virtue itself is the good, rather than the resulting flourishing.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia

5120	What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman]
	Full Idea: If we base our ethics on human flourishing, one implication would seem to be moral relativism, since what counts as 'flourishing' seems inevitably relative to one or other set of values.
	From: Gilbert Harman (Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty [1983], 9.2.1)
	A reaction: This remark seems to make the relativist assumption that all value systems are equal. For Aristotle, flourishing is no more relative than health is. No one can assert that illness has an intrinsically high value in human life.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement

12696	Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continuously created and that bodies are nothing at any time between the instants in motion.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669.04), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: Leibniz is a little over-confident about what he has 'demonstrated', but I think (from this remark) that he would not have been displeased with quantum theory, and the notion of a 'quantum leap' and a 'Planck time'. A 'conatus' is a 'smallest motion'.