16960
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If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
If some world is 'a way the world might be considered to be if things were different in a certain respect', that might show that the accessibility relation should not be taken to be transitive, and we should have to adopt modal logic T.
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From:
Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
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A reaction:
He has already rejected symmetry from the relation, for reasons concerning relative identity. He is torn between T and S4, but rejects S5, and opts not to discuss it.
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16958
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In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
In S4 logic the actual world is, in itself, special, not just from our point of view.
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From:
Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
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A reaction:
S4 lacks symmetricality, so 'you can get there, but you can't get back', which makes the starting point special. So if you think the actual world has a special place in modal metaphysics, you must reject S5?
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19347
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Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
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Full Idea:
For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
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From:
Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
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A reaction:
Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.
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16959
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If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
If our space of possible worlds has no structure, as in the semantics for S5, then, from the standpoint of the semantics, all possible worlds are on the same footing; it then becomes difficult to resist the claim that all are equally real.
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From:
Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8)
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A reaction:
This is a rather startling and interesting claim, given that modern philosophy seems full of thinkers who both espouse S5 for metaphysics, and also deny Lewisian realism about possible worlds. I'll ponder that one. Must read the new Williamson….
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20653
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Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
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Full Idea:
There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
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From:
report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
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A reaction:
I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
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16954
|
Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
In my view, Kripke's promotion of 'natural kinds', coverning chemical substances and animal and plant species, is unfortunate, since these are rather different types of things, and words used for them behave differently.
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From:
Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 2)
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A reaction:
My view is that the only significant difference among natural kinds is their degree of stability in character. Presumably particles, elements and particular molecules are fairly invariant, but living things evolve.
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