Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Positions' and 'Abduction and Induction'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction

8216	Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida]
	Full Idea: Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.76)
	A reaction: This, I think, is because there is in Derrida, as in most French philosophers, a strong streak of Marxism, and a desire to change the world, rather than merely understanding it. Idea 8213 shows the sort of thing he wants to change.

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic

8213	I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida]
	Full Idea: I have tried to analyse certain marks in writing which are undecidables, false verbal properties, which inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term, withour ever leaving room for a solution.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.40)
	A reaction: [I have simplified his sentence!] Much of Derrida seems to be a commentary on the Hegelian dialectic, and the project is presumably to figure out why philosophy is not advancing in the way we would like. Interesting...

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

19347	Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
	Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
	From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
	A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation

14790	'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it …is an inferential step which I propose to call 'abduction'. This will include a preference for any one hypothesis over others which would equally explain the facts.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I)
	A reaction: I take there to be no more important function within human thought than the procedure by which we give preference to one particular explanation. It only makes sense, I think, if we take it as part of a coherence theory of justification.

14791	Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]
	Full Idea: It is of the nature of abduction to involve an original suggestion; while typical induction has no originality in it, but only tests a suggestion already made.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I)
	A reaction: Peirce's 'abduction' is not, then, just the choice of a best explanation. He came up with the idea because he was keen to capture the creative and imaginative character of rational thought.