Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Causes and Events: Mackie on causation' and 'The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
4779 For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: A dominant view, attributed mainly to Kim, is that events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Events: Mackie on causation [1971]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
     A reaction: The obvious thought is that we might not describe something as an 'event' just because a property was exemplified (seeing red?). And WWII was an event, but a bit more than a 'property exemplification'.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
19347 Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
     Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
     From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
12191 Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Goodman's central idea was: 'If that match had been scratched, it would have lighted' is true if there are suitable truths from which, with the antecedent, the consequent can be inferred by means of a logical, or more typically natural, law.
     From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals [1947]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §4
     A reaction: Goodman then discusses the problem of identifying the natural laws, and identifying the suitable truths. I'm inclined to think counterfactuals are vaguer than that; they are plausible if coherent reasons can be offered for the inference.