19347
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Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
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Full Idea:
For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
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From:
Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
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A reaction:
Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.
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9035
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If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
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Full Idea:
If we are to 'judge' - rightly or not - that this object has a specific characteristic, it would seem that so far as the characteristic is concerned the process of abstraction must already be completed.
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From:
H.H. Price (Thinking and Experience [1953], Ch.III)
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A reaction:
Personally I think Price is right, despite the vicious attack from Geach that looms. We all know the experiences of familiarity, recognition, and identification that go on when see a person or picture. 'What animal is that, in the distance?'
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9034
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There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
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Full Idea:
If abstraction is a matter of degree, and the first faint beginnings of it are already present as soon as anything has begun to feel familiar to us, then recognition by means of signs can occur long before the process of abstraction has been completed.
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From:
H.H. Price (Thinking and Experience [1953], Ch.III)
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A reaction:
I like this, even though it is unscientific introspective psychology, for which no proper evidence can be adduced - because it is right. Neuroscience confirms that hardly any mental life has an all-or-nothing form.
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9036
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There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
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Full Idea:
We must still insist that some degree of abstraction, and even a very considerable degree of it, is present in sign-cognition, pre-verbal as it is. ...To us, who are familiar with northern winters, the ice actually looks cold.
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From:
H.H. Price (Thinking and Experience [1953], Ch.IV)
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A reaction:
Price may be in the weak position of doing armchair psychology, but something like his proposal strikes me as correct. I'm much happier with accounts of thought that talk of 'degrees' of an activity, than with all-or-nothing cut-and-dried pictures.
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9030
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Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
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Full Idea:
An abstract idea may have a dispositional as well as an occurrent interpretation. ..A man who possesses the concept Dog, when he is actually perceiving a dog can recognize that it is one, and can think about dogs when he is not perceiving any dog.
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From:
H.H. Price (Thinking and Experience [1953], Ch.IX)
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A reaction:
Ryle had just popularised the 'dispositional' account of mental events. Price is obviously right. The man may also be able to use the word 'dog' in sentences, but presumably dogs recognise dogs, and probably dream about dogs too.
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9029
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If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
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Full Idea:
There used to be a 'problem of Abstract Ideas' because it was assumed that an idea ought, somehow, to be a mental image; if some of our ideas appeared not to be images, this was a paradox and some solution must be found.
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From:
H.H. Price (Thinking and Experience [1953], Ch.VIII)
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A reaction:
Berkeley in particular seems to be struck by the fact that we are incapable of thinking of a general triangle, simply because there is no image related to it. Most conversations go too fast for images to form even of very visual things.
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20592
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Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Complex equality tries to keep advantages in one area (such as money) from translating into advantages in politics or before the law.
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From:
report of Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice [1983]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 3 'Complex'
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A reaction:
Put like that, Walzer's complex equality becomes very interesting, and pinpoints a major problem of our age, where discrepancies of wealth have become staggeringly large at the top end.
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