3 ideas
| 9560 | S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Model Theory for Modal Logic I [1978], 151), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: I have no view on this, but I am prejudiced in favour of the idea that there is a correct logic for such things, whichever one it may be. Presumably the fact that S5 has no restrictions on accessibility makes it more comprehensive and 'metaphysical'. |
| 19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
| Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates. | |
| From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that. |
| 22393 | I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot] |
| Full Idea: I am sure I do not understand the idea of a reason for acting, and I wonder whether anyone else does either. I incline to the view that all such reasons depend either on the agent's interests (meaning here what is in his interest) or else on his desires. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Reasons for Actions and Desires [1972], p.156 Post) | |
| A reaction: It seems common to assume that a reason for an action must be something rational, but it makes sense to say that the reason for someone's action was an irrational whim. Is the reason for an action just the cause of the action? |