8 ideas
| 22094 | Subjective truth can only be sustained by repetition [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| Full Idea: If subjective truth is to be more than momentary, it has to be repeated continually. | |
| From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (Repetition [1843]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed 4 | |
| A reaction: This might apply to more traditional concepts of truth, if they are to be part of life, rather than remaining in books. |
| 19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
| Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates. | |
| From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that. |
| 22410 | Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: One might have the idea that the unthinkable was itself a moral category. ...Regarding certain things even as alternatives is itself something to be regarded as dishonourable or morally absurd. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: He's very tentative about this, but I think it is a powerful moral idea. See Kekes. He is particularly aiming at utilitarians, who happily assess vile possibilities. |
| 22408 | Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The emphasis on the necessary comparability of situations is a peculiar feature of consequentialism in general. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. Utilitarians might achieve comparison by totting up the happiness in each situation, but once you include the consequences of the consequences the problems are obvious. Was 1789 a good thing? Too early to say. |
| 22411 | For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Making the best of a bad job is a consequentialist maxim, and it will have something to say even pn the difference between massacring seven million and massacring seven million and one. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: If every life counts, the consequentialists have got something right here. Not caring exactly how many were massacred is a sort of callousness (even when the number can't be established). |
| 22409 | We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If the goodness of the world were to consist in people's fulfilling their obligations, it would by no means follow that one of my obligations was to bring it about that other people kept their obligations | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: If the maxim of my action is 'ensure that everyone does their duty', presumably that can be universalised. Nelson thought so. It just sounds like a hideous world of self-righteous interference. |
| 22407 | Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism cannot hope to make sense, at any serious level, of integrity. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 1) | |
| A reaction: There will be obvious problems with this. 'My whole platoon got killed, but looking on the bright side, I preserved my integrity'. Once a theory commits entirely to one value, it then has no way to make sense of rival values. |
| 22093 | Life is a repetition when what has been now becomes [Kierkegaard] |
| Full Idea: When one says that life is a repetition one affirms that existence which has been now becomes. | |
| From: Søren Kierkegaard (Repetition [1843], p.49), quoted by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed 4 | |
| A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it seems very close to Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence. |