Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Personal Identity and Memory' and 'Sense Data and the Percept Theory'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

19347	Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
	Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
	From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
	A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

6493	We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
	Full Idea: We are not conscious of liquidity, coldness, and solidity, but of the liquidity of water, the coldness of ice, and the solidity of rocks.
	From: Roderick Firth (Sense Data and the Percept Theory [1949]), quoted by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.7
	A reaction: A nice point, but it might not be entirely true in a blindfold test, where one might only report properties like 'sticky' or 'warm', without having any clear concept of the substance being experienced. Firth is proposing the 'percept theory'.

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self

1389	If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4)
	A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma.

1390	Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
	Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria.
	From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible?