9 ideas
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: A standard objection to minimalist truth is the 'incompleteness objection'. Since there are propositions inexpressible in present English the concept of truth isn't captured by all the instances of the Tarski biconditional. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 5.3) | |
| A reaction: Sounds like a good objection. |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: The view that all quantification is substitutional is not very plausible in general. Some uses of quantifiers clearly seem to have the function to make a claim about a domain of objects out there, no matter how they relate to the terms in our language. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: Robust realists like myself are hardly going to say that quantification is just an internal language game. |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: A typed approach would imply restrictions on what it can be a property of. 'Green' is a property of surfaces, 'dark' is a property of colours. My first reaction is to opt for type-free. |
| 19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
| Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates. | |
| From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that. |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Holism says that nothing that can be said in one language can be said in another one. The expressibility hypothesis says that everything that can be said in one language can be said in every other one. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 6.4) | |
| A reaction: Obviously expressibility would only refer to reasonably comprehensive languages (with basic logical connectives, for example). Personally I vote for the expressibility hypothesis, which Hofweber seems to favour. |
| 20440 | Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman] |
| Full Idea: No definition of art is possible (since it is a referential activity), …but the symptoms of art are syntactic density, semantic density, syntactic repleteness, exemplificationality, and multiple and complex reference. | |
| From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.22-255), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4 | |
| A reaction: I wish these labels were more self-explanatory. Goodman seems to want to assimilate art to his earlier interests in linguistic anti-realism and mereology. I wouldn't have thought he now had many followers. |
| 20439 | Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli] |
| Full Idea: Artistic symbols are to be judged for the classifications they bring about, for how novel and insightful those classifications are, for how they change our world perceptions and relations. | |
| From: report of Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968]) by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be an awfully long way from our normal experience of art. I understand 'symbols' in early Flemish art, but not in Mondriaan, or even Rembrandt. |
| 20438 | A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman] |
| Full Idea: The most miserable performance without actual mistakes does count as an instance of a work, …but the most brilliant performance with a single wrong note does not. | |
| From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.186), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) | |
| A reaction: Mereological essentialism applied to art! You need to be a highly theoretical and technical philosopher (which Goodman was) to maintain such a weird and contrary-usage proposal. |
| 20437 | A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman] |
| Full Idea: Paintings and sculptures do not work within a notation; hence, there is no copying of an original that would preserve its originality. A copy of a painting is a copy, not an instance of the original. | |
| From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.212), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 2 | |
| A reaction: Sounds conclusive, but isn't. Is a poetry manuscript a 'notation' or an original? Why is an etching plate a notation, but painting on canvas is an original? Can I create a painting specifically so that it can be copied (by my students)? Intention matters. |