Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind' and 'The Language of Thought'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

19347	Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
	Full Idea: For individuation, substance needs three properties: independence, to separate it from other things; unity, to call it one thing, rather than an aggregate; and permanence or stability over time. Its other role is as subject for predicates.
	From: Franklin Perkins (Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed [2007], 3.1)
	A reaction: Perkins is describing the Aristotelian view, which is taken up by Leibniz. 'Substance' is not a controversial idea, if we see that it only means that the world is full of 'things'. It is an unusual philosopher wholly totally denies that.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

8090	Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
	Full Idea: Fodor and Jackendorff argue that since the internal language of thought, or conceptual structure, has to be more or less the same for all people, of whatever language, it will surely be something like logical form.
	From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (The Language of Thought [1975]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.8
	A reaction: The discovery (by, e.g., Frege and Russell) that there is something called 'logical form', which we can track down and represent in precise and fairly unambiguous symbolism, may be one of the greatest of all human discoveries. Perhaps.

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts

11143	If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
	Full Idea: Fodor argues that virtually all lexical concepts are innate, because most models of learning treat concept-learning as hypothesis testing, but that invariably employs the very concept to be learned.
	From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (The Language of Thought [1975]) by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 3.3
	A reaction: The obvious response is to reject the theory which gave rise to this difficulty. I take concept formation to be a fairly mechanical and barely conscious response to environment, not a process of fully rational and conscious hypothesising.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws

14349	If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]
	Full Idea: Bird argues that there are no finks at the fundamental level, and unlikely to be any antidotes. It then follows that laws at the fundamental level will all be strict - not ceteris paribus - laws.
	From: report of Tyler Burge (Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind [1986]) by Richard Corry - Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? 3
	A reaction: [Bird's main target is Nancy Cartwright 1999] This is a nice line of argument. Isn't part of the ceteris paribus problem that two fundamental laws might interfere with one another?