10 ideas
1813 | All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Twelfth mode: all reasoning leads on to further reasoning, and this process goes on forever. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1811 | Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fifteenth mode: proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1815 | Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fourteenth mode: reasoning requires arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1812 | All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Eleventh mode: all topics of discussion are full of uncertainty and contradiction. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers maintain that we literally perceive proportions and other internal relations. These relations must exist, otherwise we couldn't perceive them. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Relations [2016], 3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Mulligan 1991, and Hochberg 2013:232] This seems a rather good point. You can't perceive the differing heights of two people, yet fail to perceive that one is taller. You also perceive 'below', which is external. |
21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
Full Idea: Internal relations are determined either by the mere existence of the things they relate, or by their intrinsic characters, or they supervene on the intrinsic characters of the things they relate. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Relations [2016], 3) | |
A reaction: Suggesting that they 'supervene' doesn't explain anything (and supervenience never explains anything). I vote for the middle one - the intrinsic character. It has to be something about the existence, and not the mere fact of existence. |
21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
Full Idea: A 'unigrade' relation R has a definite degree or adicity: R is binary, or ternary....or n-ary (for some unique n). By contrast a relation is 'multigrade' if it fails to be unigrade. Causation appears to be multigrade. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Relations [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: He also cites entailment, which may have any number of premises. |
8850 | Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Agrippa's Trilemma offers three possible outcomes for a regress of justification: the chain goes on for ever (infinite); or the chain stops at an unjustified proposition (arbitrary); or the chain eventually includes the original proposition (circular). | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60], §2) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §2 | |
A reaction: This summarises Ideas 1911, 1913 and 1914. Agrippa's Trilemma is now a standard starting point for modern discussions of foundations. Personally I reject 2, and am torn between 1 (+ social consensus) and 3 (with a benign, coherent circle). |
1814 | Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Thirteenth mode: everything is always perceived in relation to something else. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
7296 | 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted] |
Full Idea: 'Grue' is not a colour. | |
From: Tom Milsted (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This simple observation strikes me as rather crucial in assessing Goodman's paradox. Blue is a colour, but grue is some sort of behaviour. Blue is a secondary quality, but grue seems to be a primary quality. |