30 ideas
| 21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers maintain that we literally perceive proportions and other internal relations. These relations must exist, otherwise we couldn't perceive them. | |
| From: Fraser MacBride (Relations [2016], 3) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Mulligan 1991, and Hochberg 2013:232] This seems a rather good point. You can't perceive the differing heights of two people, yet fail to perceive that one is taller. You also perceive 'below', which is external. |
| 21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
| Full Idea: Internal relations are determined either by the mere existence of the things they relate, or by their intrinsic characters, or they supervene on the intrinsic characters of the things they relate. | |
| From: Fraser MacBride (Relations [2016], 3) | |
| A reaction: Suggesting that they 'supervene' doesn't explain anything (and supervenience never explains anything). I vote for the middle one - the intrinsic character. It has to be something about the existence, and not the mere fact of existence. |
| 21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
| Full Idea: A 'unigrade' relation R has a definite degree or adicity: R is binary, or ternary....or n-ary (for some unique n). By contrast a relation is 'multigrade' if it fails to be unigrade. Causation appears to be multigrade. | |
| From: Fraser MacBride (Relations [2016], 1) | |
| A reaction: He also cites entailment, which may have any number of premises. |
| 19743 | A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: Beliefs are partly constituted by features of the environment. ....a notebook plays for one person the same role that memory plays for another. ...The information is reliably there, available to consciousness, and to guide action, just as belief is. | |
| From: A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §4) | |
| A reaction: This is the modern externalist approach to beliefs (along with broad content and external cognition systems). Not quite what we used to mean by beliefs, but we'll get used to it. I believe Plato wrote what it said in his books. Is memory just a role? |
| 6176 | A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands] |
| Full Idea: If the operation of a brain implant inside the brain is a cognitive operation, why should it not count as a cognitive operation when it is outside the brain? There are many mechanisms which would count as cognitive if they were inside the subject. | |
| From: report of A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: This argues for externalism of the vehicle of thought, rather than its content. The idea is that there is no significant difference between remembering a phone number and writing it on a bit of paper. I find it hard to disagree. |
| 19741 | If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognising as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process. | |
| From: A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §2) | |
| A reaction: In some sense they are obviously right that our cognitive activities spill out into books, calculators, record-keeping. It seems more like an invitation to shift the meaning of the word 'mind', than a proof that we have got it wrong. |
| 19742 | Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: Many identify the cognitive with the conscious, and it seems far from plausible that consciousness extends outside the head in these cases. But not every cognitive process, at least on standard usage, is a conscious process. | |
| From: A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §3) | |
| A reaction: This gives you two sorts of externalism about mind to consider. No, three, if you say there is extended conceptual content, then extended cognition processes, then extended consciousness. Depends what you mean by 'consciousness'. |
| 19744 | If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: If Otto relies on his notebook, what this comes to is that Otto himself is best regarded as an extended system, a coupling of biological organism and external resources. | |
| From: A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §5) | |
| A reaction: You start to get giddy as you read this stuff. If two people constantly share a notebook, they begin to blend into one another. It inclines me towards a more 'animalist' view of the nature of a person or a self. |
| 23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Many classical liberals believed that a liberal democracy could function effectively even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. …One set of private interests would check another set of private interests. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who think a completely free market will evolve into a flourishing and just society. There is a basic debate about the importance of the character of the citizens in any polity. Marxists say they are entangled. |
| 23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Galston says responsible citizenship requires four types of civic virtue: general (law-abiding, loyal), social (independent, open-minded), economic (diligent, restrained, adaptable), and political (respect, sensible, judgement, engagement). | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: [Galston's 'Liberal Purposes' 1991] (compressed) This immediately seems to be asking too much, especially for those who know little, or are short of money. |
| 23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: To defend Aristotelian republicanism it is not enough to show that individual require society - liberals do not deny this. They must also show that individuals need to be politically active. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. People are not just inactive because they have been rendered powerless. In any group of people there are some who are keen to have a voice, or lead, and others who are largely happy to follow. |
| 23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Minimal citizenship is often seen as simply requiring non-interference with others, but that ignores a basic requirement of liberal citizenship, which is the social virtue of 'civility' or 'decency'. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: He makes the point that the minimal requirement has to be given up when there is a crisis, which needs much more involvement. This largely describes modern Britain, prior to the Brexit rift. |
| 23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society …involves a radical extension of the obligations of liberal citizenship. The obligation to treat people as equal citizens now applies to everyday decisions. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: This is very difficult for an older generation who felt their 'entitlement' as leading citizens, or who routinely favoured their local traditional community. But they just have to 'get over it'! |
| 23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: According to the New Right, to promote active citizenship-for-all or entitlements, we must focus instead on people's responsibility to earn a living. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: Every creature has to earn a living, but one method is to successfully sponge off others. A cushy job is a sort of sponging. An excessively well paid job is a sort of sponging. Citizenship must involve responsibilities of some sort. |
| 23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Modern discussion has shifted from 'vote-centric' (or 'aggregative') to 'talk-centric' democracy. The vote-centric model has no mechanism for developing a consensus, or shaping public opinion, or even formulating an honourable compromise. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: I'm struck by the fact that a person's preferences betweent these two is a reflection of character, or basic attitudes to morality. Some people think democratically about their relationships, and others very obviously don't. |
| 23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: A liberal-democratic system is one in which those people who are subject to political authority have a right to participate in determining that authority. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
| A reaction: This applies to immigrants. The most anti-democratic move in recent democracies is the strategy of trying to make it more difficult to vote, perhaps by demanding identification documents, or creating huge queues. |
| 23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Our attachment to private life, I believe, is the result not (or not only) of the impoverishment of public life, but the enrichment of private life. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Perhaps a sentiment expected more from a university lecturer than from a poorly-paid labourer. Does he mean watching innumerable TV shows instead of having sing-songs in the local pub? Increased leisure is indisputable. |
| 23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Just as liberalism precludes the establishment of an official religion, so too there cannot be official cultures that have preferred status. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
| A reaction: This becomes tricky in schools, where the old way of teaching national literature and particular types of music has been eroded in modern times. But once wide diversity is allowed there is no single story which can be taught. |
| 23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Liberals need to replace the idea of 'benign neglect', and recognise the central role of nation-building in a democracy. …This means promoting a common language, and equal access to institutions operating in that language. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
| A reaction: 'Benign neglect' is non-interference with citizens' lives. Obviously the institutions include education, but is a state health service implied? Can equal access by guaranteed to private institutions? |
| 23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: On the view of 'differentiated citizenship', members of certain groups would be incorporated into the community, not only as individuals, but also through the group, and their rights would depend in part on their group membership. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously a strategy to enable marginalised individuals to be fully included in society. The downside is that individuals gain their social identity through a label, rather than through themselves, which pure liberals dislike. 'Identity politics'. |
| 23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The evidence suggests that (contrary to the Marxist view) the status hierarchy is not reducible to the economic hierarchy. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: Kymlicka is particularly thinking of racism, which lowers the status of certain groups, even if they are economically successful. I console myself for my modest economic status by getting lots of education. |
| 23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Defending multiculturalism initially involved endorsing the communitarian critique of liberalism, and viewed minority rights as defending cohesive minority groups against the encroachment of liberal individualism. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.1) | |
| A reaction: Liberal individualists have to accept these criticisms from Marxists, communitarians and multiculturalists. The lone individual has no group that guarantees support, and individuals (especially the young) can easily sink. |
| 23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The 'liberal culturalist' position is that minorities which share basic liberal principles nonetheless need minority rights. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Disabled liberals are an obvious example. This strikes me as a promising version of liberalism, which accepts the criticisms of extreme individualism. |
| 23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Many feminists express concern that multiculturalism in practice typically means giving male members of the group the power to control the women in the group. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: The way the young are treated might also be a problem. The underlying question is whether the minority group is more or less civilised than the central state. Liberalism always fights for the rights of the least powerful. |
| 23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Liberal defenders of multiculturalism must distinguish 'bad' minority rights which are restrictions from 'good' minority rights which supplement individual rights. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably no sensible liberal wants to remove all restrictions, so deeper values must be invoked to justify the mode of approved minority rights. A list of human goods seems needed. |
| 23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Why should national minorities not have the same powers of nation-building as the majority? | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
| A reaction: A 'national minority' is marked by a different language, or a different religion, or both. No one doubts the majority's right to nation-build. Some further principle would be needed to deny that right to a minority. Maybe the minority was there first? |
| 23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Liberal multiculturalism challenges status inequalities while preserving individual freedom. …Conservative multiculturalism replaces liberal principles with a communitarian politics of the common good, at least at the local or group level. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.6) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This sounds a bit simplistic. Recent emphasis on 'the common good', in the face of white supremacists etc., seems admirable, but surely challenging inequalities promotes the common good? Minority cultures are often conservative. |
| 23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Extending citizenship to include common social rights was a tool of nation-building, intended in part to construct and consolidate a sense of common national identity and culture. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: Kymlicka explains a lot of politics and society in terms of the desire of governments to 'build' their nation. You have to make people who are essentially powerless feel that they are at least in some way involved, and benefiting. |
| 23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The organisation of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: [from John Porter 1987] Does this imply that you might have rights as part of a group which you don't have as a state citizen? Positive discrimination, for example. Differential rights sounds like potential trouble. |
| 23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The development of the welfare state has been quite successful in integrating the working classes into national cultures throughout the Western democracies. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: Hard-line capitalists tend to hate the welfare state, as unfair to high earners, but it not only makes workers feel involved, but also provides a healthier, happier, more knowledgeable work force for employers. |