8 ideas
10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2) | |
A reaction: Everything is in the world. This may just be a quibble over how we should use the word 'fact'. At some point the substance of what is stated in a sentence must eventually be out there, or we would never act on what we say. |
10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: Facts are what statements (when true) state; they are not what statements are about. ..But it would be wrong to identify 'fact' and 'true statement' for these expressions have different roles in our language. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2) | |
A reaction: Personally I like to reserve the word 'facts' for what is out there, independent of any human thought or speech. As a realist, I believe that the facts are quite independent of our attempts to understand the facts. True statements attempt to state facts. |
10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: What could fit more perfectly the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §2) |
10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: It is of prime importance to distinguish the fact that the use of 'true' always glances backwards or forwards to the actual or envisaged making of a statement by someone. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Truth [1950], §1) | |
A reaction: 'The truth of this matter will never be known'. Strawson is largely right, but it is crazy for any philosopher to use the word 'always' if they can possibly avoid it. |
20363 | Leaves are unequal, but we form the concept 'leaf' by discarding their individual differences [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every concept arises through the setting equal of the unequal. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never wholly equal to another, so it is certain that the concept leaf is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense [1872]), quoted by John Richardson - Nietzsche's System 2.1.1 n28 | |
A reaction: Nietzsche adds an interesting aspect to psychological abstraction, of abstracting away the differences between things, which we might label as the (further) capacity for Equalisation. If two cars differ only in a blemish, we abstract away the blemish. |
6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand. | |
From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174) | |
A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me. |
6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world. | |
From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222) | |
A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up. |
6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there. | |
From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174) | |
A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories? |