8 ideas
7848 | Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
Full Idea: For Nietzsche philosophy begins in horror - existence is something both horrible and absurd. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Birth of Tragedy [1871]) by Keith Ansell Pearson - How to Read Nietzsche Ch.1 | |
A reaction: A striking contrast to Aristotle (Idea 549). Personally I think my philosophy begins with confusion. Not that I endorse a Wittgenteinian view, that we are just trying to cure ourselves of self-inflicted wounds. Life is very complex and we are bit simple. |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
Full Idea: When a man swears to the same tree having stood for fifty years in the same place, he means ...not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word. ...In a loose and popular sense they are said to be the same. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful distinction which we should hang on. Of course, by the standards of modern physics, nothing is strictly the same from one Planck time to the next. All is flux. So we either drop the word 'same' (for objects) or relax a bit. |
22137 | Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: Logic and observation alone do not force a scientist to reject a scientific claim if experimental observations so not turn out as expected. The scientist must reject something of the initial set of claims, but that is a matter of choice. | |
From: report of Pierre Duhem (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [1906]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 2 | |
A reaction: This is a key point against any simplified Popperian notion of falsification. Tiny observations can't kill huge well supported theories. |
18197 | Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem] |
Full Idea: The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions ...it does not designate which one should be changed. | |
From: Pierre Duhem (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [1906], p.187), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.2 | |
A reaction: This is the idea frequently invoked by Quine, in support of his holistic view of scientific knowledge (along with Neurath's Boat). |
21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
Full Idea: Though the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the same, yet they are consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: Butler's arguments seems to be that he appears to be the same person, so he is the same person. He is explicitly disagreeing with Locke. |
21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
Full Idea: Though consciousness of what is past does ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons is to say a person has not existed a single moment but what he can remember. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: An over-cautious scepticism has crept in about the reliability of bodily identity. Now we can have photographs and CCTV to prove that we experienced events we have forgotten. Butler is right. |
21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
Full Idea: One would think it really self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge can presuppose truth, which it presupposes. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: It rather begs the question to dogmatically assert that mere consciousness presupposes a self, especially after Hume's criticisms. That consciousness implies a subject to experience needs arguing for. Is it the best explanation? |
21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
Full Idea: If personality is a transient thing ...then it follows that it is a fallacy to charge ourselves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday, or what will befall us tomorrow. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: We seem to care about the past and future of our children, without actually being our children. Can't my future self be my descendant, a close one, instead of me? |