13 ideas
7848 | Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
Full Idea: For Nietzsche philosophy begins in horror - existence is something both horrible and absurd. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Birth of Tragedy [1871]) by Keith Ansell Pearson - How to Read Nietzsche Ch.1 | |
A reaction: A striking contrast to Aristotle (Idea 549). Personally I think my philosophy begins with confusion. Not that I endorse a Wittgenteinian view, that we are just trying to cure ourselves of self-inflicted wounds. Life is very complex and we are bit simple. |
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I suggest that Armstrong has an unfamiliar notion of analysis, as not primarily a quest for definitions, but as a quest for truth-makers. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand') | |
A reaction: This is not a dichotomy, I think, but a shift of emphasis. A definition will probably refer to truthmakers; a decent account of truthmakers would approximate a definition. |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Predications seem, for the most part, to be true not because of whether things are, but because of how things are. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand') | |
A reaction: This simple point shows that you get into a tangle if you insist that truthmakers just consist of what exists. Lewis says Armstrong offers states of affairs as truthmakers for predications. |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I want to say that 'truth is supervenient on being', but as an Ostrich about universals I want to construe 'being' broadly. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'Truth') | |
A reaction: [His slogan is borrowed from Bigelow 1988:132-,158-9] This seems much more promising that the more precise and restricted notion of truthmakers, as resting on the existence of particular things. Presentism is the big test case. |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Presentism says that although there is nothing outside the present, yet there are past-tensed and future-tensed truths that do not supervene on the present, and hence do not supervene on being. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], p.207) | |
A reaction: Since I rather like both presentism and truth supervening on being, this observation comes as rather a devastating blow. I thought philosophy would be quite easy, but it's turning out to be rather tricky. Could tensed truths supervene on the present? |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
Full Idea: Ontology is meaningless for a theory whose only quantification is substitutionally construed. | |
From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.64), quoted by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 03.5.1 n18 | |
A reaction: Hofweber views it as none the worse for that, since clearly lots of quantification has no ontological commitment at all. But he says it is rightly called 'a nominalists attempt at a free lunch'. |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
Full Idea: What makes ontological questions meaningless when taken absolutely is not universality but circularity. A question of the form "What is an F?" can only be answered with "An F is a G", which makes sense relative to the uncritical acceptance of G. | |
From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.53) |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To me it is mysterious how a state of affairs is made out of its particular and universal constituents. Different states of affairs may have the very same constituents, and the existence of constituents by no means entails the existence of the states. | |
From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'What is there') | |
A reaction: He is rejecting the structure of states of affairs as wholes made of parts. But then mereology was never going to explain the structure of the world. |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
Full Idea: Ontology is doubly relative. Specifying the universe of a theory makes sense only relative to some background theory, and only relative to some choice of a manual of translation of one theory into another. | |
From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.54) | |
A reaction: People tend to forget about the double nature of Quine's notion of ontological commitment, and usually only talk about the commitment of the theory being employed. Why is the philosophical community not devoting itself to the study of tranlation manuals? |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
Full Idea: We cannot know what something is without knowing how it is marked off from other things. Identity is thus of a piece with ontology. | |
From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.55) | |
A reaction: Actually it is failure of identity which seems to raise questions of individuation. If I say 'this apple is [pause] identical to this apple', I don't see how that helps me to individuate apples. |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
Full Idea: Relativity has two components: to the choice of a background theory, and to the choice of how to translate the object theory into the background theory. | |
From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.67) |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
Full Idea: For Quine, we cannot sensibly ask which is the real number five, the Frege-Russell set or the Von Neumann one. There is no arithmetical or empirical way of deciding between the two. Reference is inscrutable. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
A reaction: To generalise from a problem of reference in the highly abstract world of arithmetic, and say that all reference is inscrutable, strikes me as implausible. |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
Full Idea: The indeterminacy between 'rabbit', 'rabbit stage' and the rest depended only on a correlative indeterminacy of translation of the English apparatus of individuation - pronouns, plurals, identity, numerals and so on. | |
From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.35) | |
A reaction: This spells out the problem a little better than in 'Word and Object'. I just don't believe these problems are intractable. Quine is like a child endlessly asking 'why?'. |