16 ideas
22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: To fairly divide a cake between two children, the first divides it and the second chooses. …Even division is best, as it anticipates the second child will take the largest piece. Fairness is enforced by the children's self-interests. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Cake') | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is introduced as the basic principle of game theory. There is an online video of two cats sharing a dish of milk; each one drinks a bit, then pushes the dish to the other one. I'm sure two children could manage that. |
22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: At the most abstract level, game theory is about tables with numbers in them - numbers that entities are are efficiently acting to maximise or minimise. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Curve') | |
A reaction: A brilliant idea. The question is the extent to which real life conforms to the numberical tables. The assumption that everyone is entirely self-seeking is blatantly false. Numbers like money have diminishing marginal utility. |
22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The minimax theorem says that there is always a rational solution to a precisely defined conflict between two people whose interests are completely opposite. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Minimax') | |
A reaction: This is Von Neumann's founding theorem of game theory. It concerns maximising minimums, and minimising maximums. Crucially, I would say that it virtually never occurs that two people have completely opposite interests. There is a common good. |
22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: Prisoners A and B can support or betray one another. If both support, they each get 1 year in prison. If one betrays, the betrayer gets 0 and the betrayed gets 3. If they both betray they get 2 each. The common good is to support each other. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 06 'Tucker's') | |
A reaction: [by Albert Tucker, highly compressed] The classic Prisoner's Dilemma. It is artificial, but demonstrates that selfish behaviour gets a bad result (total of four years imprisonment), but the common good gets only two years. Every child should study this! |
22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The tragedy is when two 'nice' players defect because they misread the other's intentions. The puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma is how such good intentions pave the road to hell. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 11 'Howard's') | |
A reaction: I really wish these simple ideas were better known. They more or less encapsulate the tragedy of the human race, with its inability to prioritise the common good. |
22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The successful TIT FOR TAT strategy (for the iterated prisoner's dilemma) says cooperate on the first round, then do whatever the other player did in the previous round. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
A reaction: There are also the tougher TWO TITS FOR A TAT, and the more forgiving TIT FOR TWO TATS. The one-for-one seems to be the main winner, and is commonly seen in animal life (apparently). I recommend this to school teachers. |
22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: TIT FOR TAT threatens 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else!'. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
A reaction: Essentially human happiness arises if we are all nice, but also stand up firmly for ourselves. 'Doormats' (nice all the time) get exploited. TIT FOR TAT is weak, because it doesn't exploit people who don't respond at all. |
4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Can we say that a person has a right to life only if they didn't come into existence through rape, or that the latter have less right to life? | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.126) | |
A reaction: This would clearly be an inconsistency for some opponents of abortion who allow rape as an exception. |
4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131) | |
A reaction: A very nice point. You have a right to your life once you are the sole owner of it. |
4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson] |
Full Idea: No one is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, and other interests and commitments, for nine months, in order to keep another person alive. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.135) | |
A reaction: It is a trade-off. It might become a duty if society (or even a husband) urgently needed the baby. |
4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Maybe the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but in the right not to be killed unjustly. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131) | |
A reaction: Sounds tautological. There is no right to life, then, but just the requirement that people behave justly? |
4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson] |
Full Idea: A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.125) | |
A reaction: This relies heavily on the philosopher's concept of a 'person', but it seems right to me. |
4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Thomson suggests that abortion can be justified without the need to deny that the foetus has the moral rights of a human person. | |
From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86 | |
A reaction: Thomson uses a dubious analogy between pregnancy and being hooked up to someone for life-support. Presumably killing an innocent person is occasionally justifiable, but the situation would normally be more abnormal than pregnancy. |
4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson] |
Full Idea: It cannot seriously be thought to be murder if a mother performs an abortion on herself to save her own life (if, say, she had a serious heart condition). | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.127) | |
A reaction: An extreme view might condemn such an action, but it can hardly be based on the 'sanctity of life'. |
4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson] |
Full Idea: A fetus is not in jeopardy because it is in the womb, so an abortion originates the fatal sequence, and the mother is the agent. Hence Thomson's argument is invalid, and we must return to question of the moral status of the foetus. | |
From: comment on Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86 | |
A reaction: The problem would be if a 'person' was safe, but only if I continue some sustained effort which is not required of me by normal duties. |
4422 | The end need not be the goal, as in the playing of a melody (and yet it must be completed) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Not every end is the goal; the end of a melody is not its goal; and yet: as long as the melody has not reached its end, it also hasn't reached its goal. A parable. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Wanderer and his Shadow [1880], §204) | |
A reaction: A nice message for Aristotle, that there is no simple separation of ends and means. |