7 ideas
5021 | An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every idea is analysed perfectly only when it is demonstrated a priori that it is possible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.3) | |
A reaction: I take it he means metaphysical possibility, rather than natural, or we can't think about pigs flying. He probably has maths in mind. Seeing the possibility of something may well amount to understanding its truth conditions. |
22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh') | |
A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge. |
22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth') | |
A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'. |
5020 | Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Whatever is thought by us is either conceived through itself, or involves the concept of another. …Thus one must proceed to infinity, or all thoughts are resolved into those which are conceived through themselves. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to embody the rationalist attitude to foundations. I am sympathetic. Experiences just come to us as basic, but they don't qualify as 'thoughts', let alone knowledge. Experiences are more 'given' than 'conceptual'. |
22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth') | |
A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it. |
5019 | Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The supreme happiness of man consists in the greatest possible increase of his perfection. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1) | |
A reaction: I fear that (being a great intellectual) he had a rather intellectual interpretation of 'perfection'. This is in danger of being a tautology, but if the proposal is given an Aritotelian slant I am sympathetic. |
20957 | We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling] |
Full Idea: Nobody has chosen their character; and yet this does not stop anybody attributing the action which follows from his character to themself as a free action. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (The Ages of the World [1810], I.93) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints a very nice ambivalence about our attitudes to our own characters. We all have some pride and shame about who we are, without having chosed who we are. At least when we are young. But we make the bed we lie in. |