4 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
12697 | Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Pacidius Philalethi dialogue [1676], A6.3.565-6), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
A reaction: This is incipient monadology, that the bottom level of division ceases to be parts of a thing, and arrives at a different order of entity, to explain the parts of things. Leibniz denies that this subdivision comes down to points. |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |
20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: Intentional actions are those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Intention [1957], p.9), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 2 'Two kinds' | |
A reaction: This works better for grand large-scale actions than for small ones, like taking the knife out of the drawer before the fork. Kahnemann nowadays tells us that the reasons we articulate might not be the ones that are operative. |