Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intentionality of Sensation', 'talk' and 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

15785	Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
	Full Idea: We must distinguish between what we are committed to existing in the actual world or a possible world ('ontology'), and what we are committed to as a part of our ways of dealing with the world conceptually, as a part of our conceptual system ('ideology').
	From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
	A reaction: I think this is the most illuminating idea I have read on the subject of ontological commitment. I'm fighting for the idea that what we think is true should be kept separate from what we think exists. Ideology is a nice addition to the mix.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

15786	Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
	Full Idea: Quantification over members of one particular world is a measure of ideology, quantification that crosses possible worlds is often a measure of ideology.
	From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
	A reaction: I like this. See Idea 15785 for the underlying distinction. It leaves the question open of what we might mean by 'ideological commitment'.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness

6668	If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall]
	Full Idea: Given the paradoxical nature of the 'present' moment, maybe we should understand ALL consciousness as memory, with the split second of the 'specious present' being very vivid and very brief memory, with the rest of the mind remembering in lower degrees.
	From: David Marshall (talk [2004]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This strikes me as a highly plausible, and very illuminating remark. For the time paradox, see Ideas 1904 and 5102. Anyone researching consciousness in the brain should think about this, because it will just be a special sort of memory neurons.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

7439	The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
	Full Idea: Anscombe argued that the qualities involved in sensations are one and all intentional only (and I think this holds even for the bodily sensations).
	From: report of G.E.M. Anscombe (The Intentionality of Sensation [1965]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xxii
	A reaction: Compare Harry Gildersleve's exactly opposite proposal in Idea 7272. I think I am coming round to the Anscombe view, which builds the more mysterious up from the less mysterious. Gildersleve must explain how atomic qualia arise.