Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intention', 'Universal Arithmetick' and 'works'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
17783 A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton]
     Full Idea: By a Number we understand not so much a Multitude of Unities, as the abstracted Ratio of any Quantity to another Quantity of the same Kind, which we take for unity.
     From: Isaac Newton (Universal Arithmetick [1669]), quoted by John Mayberry - What Required for Foundation for Maths? p.407-2
     A reaction: This needs a metaphysics of 'kinds' (since lines can't have ratios with solids). Presumably Newton wants the real numbers to be more basic than the natural numbers. This is the transition from Greek to modern.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
3534 To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: To be is to have causal powers.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927], §4), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation
     A reaction: This is sometimes called Alexander's Principle. It is first found in Plato, and is popular with physicalists, but there are problem cases... A thing needs to exist in order to have causal powers. To exist is more than to be perceived.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
3398 Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
     A reaction: An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20041 Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
     Full Idea: Intentional actions are those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.
     From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Intention [1957], p.9), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 2 'Two kinds'
     A reaction: This works better for grand large-scale actions than for small ones, like taking the knife out of the drawer before the fork. Kahnemann nowadays tells us that the reasons we articulate might not be the ones that are operative.