66 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's account of names and definite descriptions was concerned to preserve the law of excluded middle, according to which every sentence is either true or false (but it is not obvious that the law ought to be preserved). | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: That is the strongest form of excluded middle, but things work better if every sentence is either 'true' or 'not true', leaving it open whether 'not true' actually means 'false'. |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: On Russell's view 'Elizabeth II = Queen of England' is only superficially an identity-statement; really it is a predication, and attributes a complex relational property to Elizabeth. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: The original example is 'Scott = author of Waverley'. Why can't such statements be identities, in which the reference of one half of the identity is not yet known? 'The murderer is violent' and 'Smith is violent' suggests 'Smith is the murderer'. |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I take the notion of the variable as fundamental. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.42) | |
| A reaction: A key idea of twentieth century philosophy, derived from Frege and handed on to Quine. A universal term, such as 'horse', is a variable, for which any particular horse can be its value. You can calculate using x, and generalise about horses. |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed that names do not express a Fregean sense, ...but are disguised definite descriptions, of the form 'the F'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: Of course, Russell then has a famous theory about definite descriptions, which turns them into quantifications. |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Russell (and Frege) thought that Mill was wrong about names: really a proper name, properly used, simply was a definite description abbreviated or disguised. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1 | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to oversimplify this issue, one way or the other, but essentially one has to agree with Kripke that naming does not inherently involve description, but is a 'baptism', without initial content. Connotations and descriptions accrue to a name. |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| Full Idea: Russell's view of names, understood as a definite description, which is understood as a quantificational phrase, is not to contribute an object to propositions, but to contribute a complex of properties. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to contradict the role of constants in first-logic, which are the paradigm names, picking out an object in the domain. Kripke says names and definite descriptions have different modal profiles. |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's proposal that a natural name is an abbreviated description invites four objections: not all speakers can produce descriptions; the description could be false; no one description seems special; and descriptions usually contain names. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 8.74 | |
| A reaction: The best reply on behalf of Russell is probably to concede all of these points, but deny that any of them are fatal. Most replies will probably say that they are possible true descriptions, rather than actual limited, confused or false ones. |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| Full Idea: For Russell, a logically proper name introduces its referent into the proposition, whereas a description introduces a certain quantificational structure, not its denotation. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L0 | |
| A reaction: I have very strong resistance to the idea that the actual referent could ever become part of a proposition. I am not, and never have been, part of a proposition! Russell depended on narrow 'acquaintance', which meant that few things qualified. |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| Full Idea: Russell defined a logically proper name to be one the meaning of which is its referent. However, his internalist epistemology led him to deny that the words we ordinarily call names are logically proper. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 1.25 |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory used quantification to eliminate singular terms, which could be meaningful without denoting anything. He reparsed such sentences so they appeared as predicates instead of names. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy IX.A.2 |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Though someone just beginning to learn English might take it as one, "nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: If someone replies to "nobody's there" with "show him to me!", presumably it IS a singular term - just one that doesn't work very well. If you want to get on in life, treat it as a quantifier; if you just want to have fun... |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's account implies that all sentences composed of an empty name and a predicate are false, including 'Pegasus was a mythical creature'. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
| A reaction: Russell insists that such sentences contain a concealed existence claim, which they clearly don't. |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| Full Idea: The main objections to Russell's theory of descriptions are to say that definite descriptions sometime are referring expressions, and disputing the claim that definite descriptions embody both uniqueness and existence claims. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: The first one seems particularly correct, as you can successfully refer with a false description. See Colin McGinn (Idea 6067) for criticism of the existence claim made by the so-called 'existential' quantifier. |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: Russell's reasons for saying that definite descriptions are not referring expressions are: some definite descriptions have no referent, and they cannot be referring when used in negative existential truths, or in informative identity sentences. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5 | |
| A reaction: The idea is that by 'parity of form', if they aren't referring in these situations, they aren't really referring in others. Sainsbury notes that if there are two different forms of definite description (referential and attributive) these arguments fail. |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: When a statement of being or non-being is analysed by Russell's theory of descriptions it ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity, so the being of such an entity is no longer presupposed. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Willard Quine - On What There Is p.6 |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Russell showed that his theory of definite descriptions affords solutions to each of four vexing logical problems: the Problems of Apparent Reference to Non-existents and Negative existentials, Frege's Puzzle about Identity, and Substitutivity. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language 2.Over | |
| A reaction: You must seek elsewhere for the explanations of the four problems, but this gives some indication of why Russell's theory was famous, and was felt to be a breakthrough in explaining logical forms. |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| Full Idea: With the devices of the Theory of Descriptions at hand, it was no longer necessary to take 'the' as indefinable, and it was possible to diminish greatly the number of entities to which a logical system is ontologically committed. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.13 | |
| A reaction: Illuminating, because it shows that ontology is what drove Russell at this time, and really they were all searching for Quine's 'desert landscapes', which minimalise commitment. |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the notions of predicate logic - specifically, 'some', 'every', and 'same as'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.2.7 | |
| A reaction: This helpfully clarifies Russell's project - to find the logical form of every sentence, expressed in terms which are strictly defined and consistent. This huge project now looks rather too optimistic. Artificial Intelligence would love to complete it. |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's analysis of 'the baby is crying' seems to imply that this can only be true if there is just one baby in the world; ..to dispose of the objection, it seems necessary to appeal implicitly or explicitly to a 'domain of discourse'. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This objection leads to ordinary language philosophy, and the 'pragmatics' of language. It is standard in modern predicate logic to specify the domain over which an expression is quantified. |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed that descriptions be treated along with the quantifiers, which departs from Frege, who treated descriptions as proper names. ...the problem was that names invoke objects, and there is no object in failed descriptions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.16 | |
| A reaction: Maybe we just allow intentional objects (such as unicorns) into our ontology? Producing a parsimonious ontology seems to be the main motivation of most philosophy of language. Or maybe names are just not committed to actual existence? |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Russell attempted to avoid Meinong's strategy (of saying 'The present King of France' refers to a 'non-existent object') by denying that definite descriptions are proper names. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.7 | |
| A reaction: Russell claimed that there was a covert existence claim built into a definite description. What about descriptions in known counterfactual situations ('Queen of the Fairies')? |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: Since Russell did not want to introduce non-existent objects, or declare many sentences meaningless, he prevented the problem from getting started, by denying that 'the present King of France is bald' is really a subject-predicate sentence. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 4.1 |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory says that sentences which apparently serve to refer to particulars are really assertions about properties. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
| A reaction: Right. Which is why particulars get marginalised in Russell, and universals take centre stage. I can't help suspecting that talk of de re/de dicto reference handles this problem better. |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory makes an exciting distinction between logical and grammatical form, but any theory which says that every positive statement, without distinction, about objects which don't exist is false, has to be wrong. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Some logicians charge that the theory of descriptions as it stands is formally inadequate because it lacks explicit conventions for the scope of quantifiers, and that when these conventions are added the theory becomes unduly complex. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.97 | |
| A reaction: [Especially in modal contexts, apparently] I suppose if the main point is to spell out the existence commitments of the description, then that has to include quantification, for full generality. |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes claimed that the behaviour of definite non-count descriptions shows Russell's Theory of Descriptions itself to be false. ....but it isn't a general theory of descriptions, but precisely a theory of singular descriptions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Henry Laycock - Words without Objects 3.1 |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: Denoting phrases are central to mathematics, especially in Russell's 'logicist' theory, in which they are crucial to identifying classes ('the class of all mortal beings', 'the class of natural numbers'). | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: This explains the motivation for Russell's theory of definite descriptions, since he thinks reference is achieved by description. Russell nearly achieved an extremely complete philosophical system. |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions has as an immediate consequence the doctrine that molecular sentences containing definite descriptions are syntactically ambiguous as regards the scope of the definite description. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David Kaplan - How to Russell a Frege-Church I | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is a virtue of Russell's account, and an advert for analytic philosophy, because it reveals an ambiguity which was there all the time. |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Nowadays Russell's position is routinely put by saying that existence is what is expressed by the existential quantifier and only by that. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: We must keep separate how you express existence, and what it is. Quantifiers seem only to be a style of expressing existence; they don't offer any insight into what existence actually is, or what we mean by 'exist'. McGinn dislikes quantifiers. |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions allows us to avoid being ontologically committed to objects simply by virtue of using descriptions which seemingly denote them. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 1.1.2 | |
| A reaction: This I take to be why Russell's theory is a famous landmark. I personally take ontological commitment to be independent of what we specifically say. Others, like Quine, prefer to trim what we say until the commitments seem sound. |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: The real Platonic entities left standing after the Theory of Descriptions were propositions (not classes or numbers), and their constituents did not include denoting concepts or classes, but only individuals (Socrates) and universals (mortality). | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Propositions look like being the problem here. If we identify them with facts, it is not clear how many facts there are in the universe, independent of human thought. Indeed, how many universals are there? Nay, how many individuals? See Idea 7534. |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's view makes it impossible to attribute existence to properties, and this would have to be declared ill-formed and meaningless. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a powerful criticism, used to support McGinn's view that existence cannot be analysed, using quantifiers or anything else. |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell says one won't find the present King of France on the list of bald things, nor on the list of things that are not bald. It would seem that this gives rise to a violation of the law of excluded middle. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 2 | |
| A reaction: It's a bit hard to accuse the poor old King of violating a law when he doesn't exist. |
| 14703 | Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: If we have a 'fixedly' operator F, then a sentence is fixedly actually true if it is true no matter which world is designated as actual (which 'he actually won in 2008' fails to be). Maybe '□' is superficial necessity, and FA is 'deep' necessity. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.2.2) | |
| A reaction: Gareth Evans distinguishes 'deep' from 'superficial' necessity. Humberstone and others introduced 'F'. Presumably FA is deeper because it has to pass a tougher test. |
| 14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: It seems apriori coherent that there could be a necessarily existing god, and that there could be no such god - but they can't both be true. Other examples include unprovable mathematical necessities | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.3.4) |
| 14704 | 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: Generalized 2D semantics is meant to vindicate the traditional idea that we have apriori access to our own meanings through armchair reflection. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: The idea is to split meaning in two, so that we know one part of it a priori. It is an unfashionably internalist view of meaning (which doesn't make it wrong!). |
| 14706 | Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: Your verdicts about whether the stuff on Twin Earth counts as water depends on whether you think of Twin Earth as a hypothesis about your actual environment or as a purely counterfactual possibility. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.2.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the 'two-dimensional semantics' approach to the Twin Earth problem, which splits meaning into two components. Whether you start from the actual world or from Twin Earth, you will rigidly designate the local wet stuff as 'water'. |
| 14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: In rationalist views of meaning, based on the 'golden triangle', to be competent with an expression is to be in an internal cognitive state that puts one in a position to identify its extension in any possible world based only on apriori reflection. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.3.1) | |
| A reaction: This looks like a proper fight-back against modern rampant externalism about meaning. All my intuitions are with internalism, which I think points to a more coherent overall philosophy. Well done, David Chalmers! Even if he is wrong. |
| 14717 | Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: Internalists take the notion of meaning to capture an aspect of an individual's current state of understanding, while externalists take the notion of meaning to reflect how an individual is embedded within her social and physical environment. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This idea also occurs in discussions of concepts (filed here under 'Thought'). |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this. Presumably phrases which appear to refer actually point at other parts of language rather than the world. |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| Full Idea: If I am right, referring is not the same as denoting and the referential use of definite descriptions is not recognised on Russell's view. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Keith Donnellan - Reference and Definite Descriptions §I | |
| A reaction: This introduces a new theory of reference, which goes beyond the mere contents of linguistic experessions. It says reference is an 'external' and 'causal' affair, and so a definite description is not sufficient to make a reference. |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: In Russell's definition of 'denoting', a definite description denotes an entity if that entity fits the description uniquely. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.2 | |
| A reaction: [Recanati cites Donnellan for this] Hence denoting is not the same thing as reference. A description can denote beautifully, but fail to refer. Donnellan says if denoting were reference, someone might refer without realising it. |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.43) | |
| A reaction: This is the important idea that the sentence is the basic unit of meaning, rather than the word. I'm not convinced that this dispute needs to be settled. Words are pretty pointless outside of propositions, and propositions are impossible without words. |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If we say 'Scott is the author of Waverley', we assert an identity of denotation with a difference of meaning. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.46) | |
| A reaction: This shows Russell picking up Frege's famous distinction, as shown in 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. To distinguish the meaning from the reference was one of the greatest (and simplest) clarifications ever offered of how language works. |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Russell, since he eliminates descriptions from his primitive notation, seems to hold in 'On Denoting' that the notion of 'sense' is illusory. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 04 | |
| A reaction: Presumably we can eliminate sense from formal languages, but natural languages are rich in connotations (or whatever we choose to call them). |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell assumes that it is expressions which refer if anything does, but strictly speaking it is WE who refer with the use of expressions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
| A reaction: This sounds right. Russell is part of the overemphasis on language which plagued philosophy after Frege. Words are tools, like searchlights or pointing fingers. |
| 14720 | Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: A semantic theory assigns semantic values (meanings) to particular expressions of the language. In contrast, a metasemantic theory explains why expressions have those semantic values, appealing to facts about speakers and communities. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: Presumably some people only want the metasemantic version. I assume that the two are entangled, but I would vote for both. |
| 14695 | Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: Semantic theories explain how the truth or falsity of whole sentences depends on the meanings of their parts by stating rules governing the interpretation of subsentential expressions and their modes of combination. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1) | |
| A reaction: Somehow it looks as if the mystery of the whole business will still be missing if this project is ever successfully completed. Also one suspects that such a theory would be a fiction, rather than a description of actuality, which is too complex. |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Russell rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, on the grounds that, if reference is mediated by sense, we lose the idea of direct acquaintance and succumb to Descriptivism. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 1.1 | |
| A reaction: [15,000th IDEA in the DB!! 23/3/2013, Weymouth] Recanati claims Russell made a mistake, because you can retain the sense/reference distinction, and still keep direct acquaintance (by means of 'non-descriptive senses'). |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Russell does not claim that Frege's notion of sense is incoherent, but rather that it is superfluous. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.9 | |
| A reaction: My initial reaction to this is that the notion of strict and literal meaning (see Idea 7309) is incredibly useful. Some of the best jokes depend on the gap between implications and strict meaning. How could metaphors be explained without it? |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions proceeds by sketching the truth conditions of sentences containing descriptions, and arguing on various grounds that they are the correct truth conditions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: It seems important to see both where Russell was going, and where Davidson has come from. The whole project of finding the logical form of sentences (which starts with Frege and Russell) implies that truth conditions is what matters. |
| 14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: The simplest semantic frameworks assign extensions as semantic values of particular expressions. The extension of a name is the thing, of 'cool' is the set of cool things, and sets of ordered pairs for 2-place predicates. The sentence has T or F. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1) | |
| A reaction: The immediate well-known problem is different predicates with the same extensions, such as 'renate' and 'cordate'. Possible worlds semantics is supposed to be an improvement to cover this, and to give a semantics for modal talk as well. Sounds good. |
| 14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: A simple extensional semantics will assign the same semantic value to 'Roger Federer' and 'world's best tennis player', but they clearly differ in meaning, and if events had unfolded differently they would pick out different people. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1) | |
| A reaction: You would think that this would be too obvious to need pointing out, but it is clearly a view that had a lot of popularity before the arrival of possible worlds. |
| 14698 | Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: In standard possible worlds semantics, the semantic value of an expression is an 'intension', a function that assigns an extension to the expression 'at' every possible world. ...It keeps track of the 'modal profiles' of objects, kinds and properties. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1) | |
| A reaction: Personally I just don't buy a semantics which is entirely based on extensions, even if this has sorted out some more obvious problems of extensionality. When I say someone is 'my hero', I don't just mean to pick out a particular person. |
| 14699 | Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: In standard possible worlds semantics the semantic value of Hllary Clinton's utterance of 'I' will be the same as her utterance of 'Hillary Clinton'. But clearly the English word 'I' is not synonymous with the name 'Hillary Clinton'. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1) | |
| A reaction: This problem was spotted by Kaplan, and it has been a chief motivator for the creation of two-dimensional semantics, which some people have then extended into a complete semantic theory. No purely extensional semantics can be right. |
| 14709 | Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: In standard possible world semantics an expression's intension reflects the modal profile of an object, kind or property, which would establish an important constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.3.1) | |
| A reaction: The central question becomes 'do you need to know a thing's modal profile in order to have a decent understanding of it?', but if you express it that way (my way), then what counts as 'decent' will be relative to all sorts of things. |
| 14719 | In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: A problem for a standard possible worlds analysis is that all necessary truths have precisely the same content (the function mapping every world to the True). Hesperus=Phosphorus has the same content as Hesperus=Hesperus-and-2+2=4. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: If this is supposed to be a theory of meaning then it has gone very badly wrong indeed. Has modern semantics taken a wrong turning somewhere? Two-dimensionalism is meant to address some of these problems. |
| 14701 | Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: In a two-dimensional matrix we array possible circumstances of evaluation (worlds) along the horizontal axis, and possible contexts of utterance (world, person, time) along the vertical axis. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.2) | |
| A reaction: This is due to Stalnaker 1978, and is clearest in operation when applied to an indexical such as 'I' in 'I am President'. 'I' is a rigid designator, but depends on context. The grid is filled in with T or F for each utterance in each world. |
| 14702 | If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: At first glance necessity and possibility can be fully expressed by quantifying over all possible worlds, but this cannot capture 'Possibly everything actually red is also shiny'. This needs a double-indexed framework, with worlds playing two roles. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.2.1) | |
| A reaction: She points out that this also applies to tense logic, for the notion of 'now'. The point is that we not only need a set of possible worlds, but we also need a procedure (the 'Actuality' operator A or @) for picking out one of the worlds as special. |
| 14705 | Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps our best way of understanding names and natural kind terms is that we have apriori access to currently associated reference-fixing criterion, but only a posteriori access to the associated modal profile. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: This is the 'generalized' view of 2D semantics (covering everything, not just modals and indexicals). I know apriori what something is, but only study will reveal its possibilities. The actual world is easy to talk about, but possible worlds are harder. |
| 14715 | 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: Supporters of generalized two-dimensional semantics agree to defend apriori conceptual analysis in metaphysics, and that 2D captures meaning and not just belief-patterns, and it gives a broadly internalist approach to reference determination. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.3.4) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I can evaluate this, but I sort of like conceptual analysis, and the concept of meaning, and fairly internalist views of reference, so I am ripe for the picking. |
| 14716 | 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: It is objected to 2D semantics that it cannot explain Kripke's cases of contingent apriori truths, for there is no single proposition (construed as a set of possible worlds) that is both apriori and contingent. | |
| From: Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.4.2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a rather large objection to the whole 2D plan, if it implies that when we say something there is no single proposition that is being expressed. |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In every proposition that we can apprehend, ...all the constituents are real entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.56), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the 'Russellian' concept of a proposition. It strikes me as entirely wrong. The examples are always nice concrete objects like Mont Blanc, but as an account of sophisticated general propositions it seem hopeless. |
| 20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |
| Full Idea: Intentional actions are those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. | |
| From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Intention [1957], p.9), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 2 'Two kinds' | |
| A reaction: This works better for grand large-scale actions than for small ones, like taking the knife out of the drawer before the fork. Kahnemann nowadays tells us that the reasons we articulate might not be the ones that are operative. |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'There is one and only one entity x which is most perfect; that one has all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore that one exists' fails as a proof because there is no proof of the first premiss. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.54) | |
| A reaction: This is the modern move of saying that existence (which is 'not a predicate', according to Kant) is actually a quantifier, which isolates the existence claim being made about a variable with a bunch of predicates. McGinn denies Russell's claim. |