Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Universals and Propositions', 'Lecture on Nominalism' and 'Moral Luck'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
21697 The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine]
     Full Idea: The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [which I name from the Greek for 'ostrich']
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §4)
     A reaction: David Armstrong said this is the the fallacy involved in a denial of universals. Quine is accusing Carnap and co. of the fallacy.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
21698 All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine]
     Full Idea: Much of the theory of relations can be developed as a virtual theory, in which we seem to talk of relations, but can explain our notation in terms {finally] of just the logic of truth-functions, quantification and identity. The exception is ancestrals.
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §8)
     A reaction: The irreducibility of ancestrals is offered as a reason for treating sets as universals.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
21696 Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine]
     Full Idea: 'Nominalism' is distinct from 'extensionalism'. The main point of the latter doctrine is rejection of properties or attributes in favour of classes. But class are universals equally with attributes, and nominalism in the defined sense rejects both.
     From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §3)
     A reaction: Hence Quine soon settled on labelling himself as an 'extensionalist', leaving proper nominalism to Nelson Goodman. It is commonly observed that science massively refers to attributes, so they can't just be eliminated.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8511 Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
     Full Idea: In modern times, it was G.F. Stout who first explicitly made the proposal that properties and relations are as particular as the substances that they qualify.
     From: report of G.F. Stout (The Nature of Universals and Propositions [1923]) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §1
     A reaction: Note that relations will have to be tropes, as well as properties. Williams wants tropes to be parts of objects, but that will be tricky with relations. If you place two objects on a table, how does the 'to the left of' trope come into existence?
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
3271 We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Our beliefs are always due to factors outside of our control.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.27)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
3272 Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Moral luck involves one's character, the antecedent circumstances of the act, the actual circumstances of the act, and the outcome of the act.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.28)
     A reaction: Meaning, I take it, that there can be luck in any one of those four. A neat slicing up that doesn't quite fit the real world, where things flow. Helpful, though.