Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Contingency', 'On the Freedom of the Will' and 'Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
17619 We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine]
     Full Idea: We do not believe in abstract entities..... We renounce them altogether.
     From: Goodman,N/Quine,W (Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism [1947], p.105), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Defending the Axioms
     A reaction: Goodman always kept the faith here, but Quine decided to embrace sets, as a minimal commitment to abstracta needed for mathematics, which was needed for science. My sympathies are with Goodman. This is the modern form of 'nominalism'.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
14895 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
     Full Idea: Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2
     A reaction: This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11881 Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Evans argues that there can be rigid designators that are meaningful even if empty.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.8
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
21378 We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Another fact of consciousness ...is the wholly clear and certain feeling of responsibility for what we do, of the accountability of our actions, which rests on the unshakable certainty that we ourselves are the doers of our deeds.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Freedom of the Will [1841], p.93-4), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Freedom'
     A reaction: The point is that we have this feeling even if we do not believe in free will. I am struck by the fact that responsibility is very obvious in our own case, even if it is not when we objectively consider other people. Even villains can feel guilty.