Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Contingency', 'Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility' and 'Hobbes'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12185 Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity.
     From: report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §1
     A reaction: [her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
14895 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macią/Garcia-Carpentiro]
     Full Idea: Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macią/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2
     A reaction: This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11881 Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Evans argues that there can be rigid designators that are meaningful even if empty.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.8
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
7413 Without confidence in our beliefs, how should we actually live? [Tuck]
     Full Idea: The central question for sceptics is if we lose confidence in the truth of most existing beliefs, then how do we actually live?
     From: Richard Tuck (Hobbes [1989], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Scepticism is not, of course, all or nothing. You can lead a 'normal' life in a virtual reality machine. I find it much more of a struggle to live if I lose faith in values, than if I lose faith in tables.