25 ideas
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
Full Idea: There are two related but distinguishable questions concerning proper names: what the speaker denotes (upon an occasion), and what the name denotes. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: I don't think any account of language makes sense without this sort of distinction, as in my favourite example: the password is 'swordfish'. So how does language gets its own meanings, independent of what speakers intend? |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
Full Idea: We need an account of what makes an expression into a name for something that will allow names to change their denotations. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
A reaction: Presumably an example would be 'The Prime Minister is in the building'. Evans proposes to discuss communication, rather than strict meanings and descriptions. |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
Full Idea: Intentions alone don't bring it about that a name gets a denotation; without the intention being manifest there cannot be the common knowledge required for the practice. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
A reaction: Well, I might have a private name for some hated colleague which I mutter to myself whenever I see her. The way names, and language generally, becomes ossified is by joining the great impersonal sea of the language. ..waves of bones, |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
Full Idea: Change of denotation is decisive against the Causal Theory of Names. Changes of denotation actually occur: a hearsay report misunderstood by Marco Polo transferred the name 'Madagascar' from a portion of the mainland to the African island. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound decisive, as you could give an intermediate causal account of Marco Polo's mistake. I might take the famous name Winston, and baptise my son with it. And I might have done it because I thought Winston was a German dictator. |
13489 | Von Neumann treated cardinals as a special sort of ordinal [Neumann, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann's decision was to start with the ordinals and to treat cardinals as a special sort of ordinal. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 3 | |
A reaction: [see Hart 73-74 for an explication of this] |
12336 | A von Neumann ordinal is a transitive set with transitive elements [Neumann, by Badiou] |
Full Idea: In Von Neumann's definition an ordinal is a transitive set in which all of the elements are transitive. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Alain Badiou - Briefings on Existence 11 |
18179 | For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than {n}) [Neumann, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than Zermelo's successor, which is {n}). | |
From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.2 n8 |
18180 | Von Neumann numbers are preferred, because they continue into the transfinite [Maddy on Neumann] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann's version of the natural numbers is in fact preferred because it carries over directly to the transfinite ordinals. | |
From: comment on John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.2 n9 |
15925 | Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors [Neumann, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors. ...He had shown how to introduce ordinal numbers as sets, making it possible to use them without leaving the domain of sets. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite V.3 |
12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: A generalisation is explanatory if and only if it is invariant. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Jim Woodward 2003] I dislike the idea that generalisations and regularities explain anything at all, but this rule sounds like a bare minimum for being taken seriously in the space of explanations. |
12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: The main alternative to the dispositional theory of biological functions (which confer a survival-enhancing propensity) is the etiological theory (effects are functions if they play a role in the causal history of that very component). | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: [Bigelow/Pargetter 1987 for the first, Mitchell 2003 for the second] The second one sounds a bit circular, but on the whole a I prefer causal explanations to dispositional explanations. |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Nothing can count as a mechanism unless it produces some macro-level regular behaviour. To produce macro-level regular behaviour, it has to rely on micro-level regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: This is the core of Leuridan's argument that regularities are more basic than mechanisms. It doesn't follow, though, that the more basic a thing is the more explanatory work it can do. I say mechanisms explain more than low-level regularities do. |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the Humean rearguard action in favour of the regularity account of laws. Wrong, but a nice paper. This point shows why only powers (despite their vagueness!) are the only candidate for the bottom level of explanation. |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: To model a mechanism one must incorporate pragmatic laws. ...As valuable as the concept of mechanism and mechanistic explanation are, they cannot replace regularities nor undermine their relevance for scientific explanation. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 12786 for 'pragmatic laws'] I just don't see how the observation of a regularity is any sort of explanation. I just take a regularity to be something interesting which needs to be explained. |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Summary: mechanisms depend on regularities, there may be regularities without mechanisms, models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, and pragmatic laws do not depend epistemologically on mechanistic models. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 14382 for 'pragmatic' laws. I'm quite keen on mechanisms, so this is an arrow close to the heart, but at this point I say that my ultimate allegiance is to powers, not to mechanisms. |
14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation. |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
Full Idea: In general, a speaker intends to refer to the item that is the dominant source of his associated body of information. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a theory of reference which fully preserves the spirit of traditional empiricism. Speakers refer to ideas which connect to the source of their underlying impressions. |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
Full Idea: A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x's being the intended referent of S's use of a name is that x should be the source of the causal origin of the body of information that S has associated with the name. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: This is Evans's adaptation of Kripke's causal theory of names. This cries out for a counterexample. I say something about General Montgomery, having just listened to 'Monty's Double' give a talk, believing it was Montgomery? |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
Full Idea: The strong thesis (that descriptions are sufficient for reference) is outrageous. It would mean that if Mr X is wrongly introduced to me as Mr Y, then I truly say 'this is Mr Y' if X overwhelmingly satisfies descriptions of Y. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: [I omit some qualifying phrases] Evans says that probably no one ever held this view. It seems right. In the case of an electron it would seem that all the descriptions could be the same, except space-time location. Same electron as yesterday? |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
Full Idea: Sometimes we use expressions with the overriding intention to conform to the use made of them by some other person or persons. I shall say we use the expression 'deferentially'; examples might be 'viol' or 'minuet'. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
A reaction: I presume Evans wasn't very musical. This label sounds useful, if you wish to connect Grice's account of meaning with Putnam's externalist account of concepts, where deference to experts is crucial. Is all linguistic usage deferential? |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
Full Idea: I think the Principle of Charity (maximise true beliefs) is unacceptable. The acceptable principle enjoins minimizing the attribution of inexplicable error and cannot be operated without a theory of the causation of belief for the creatures investigated. | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
A reaction: The normal principle of charity certainly seems on shaky ground if you think you have encountered a fairly normal tribe, when they in fact are in possession of the weirdest belief system on the entire planet. |
14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: The dispositional theory of biological functions is not unquestioned. The main alternative is the etiological theory: a component's effect is a function of that component if it has played an essential role in the causal history of its existence. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: [He cites S.D. Mitchell 2003] Presumably this account is meant to fit into a theory of evolution in biology. The obvious problem is where something comes into existence for one reason, and then acquires a new function (such as piano-playing). |
14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: A generalization is a 'pragmatic law' if it allows of prediction, explanation and manipulation, even if it fails to satisfy the traditional criteria. To this end, it should describe a stable regularity, but not necessarily a universal and necessary one. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: I am tempted to say of this that all laws are pragmatic, given that it is rather hard to know whether reality is stable. The universal laws consist of saying that IF reality stays stable in certain ways, certain outcomes will ensue necessarily. |
14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Strict regularities are rarely if ever discovered in the life sciences. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: This is elementary once it is pointed out, but too much philosophy have science has aimed at the model provided by the equations of fundamental physics. Science is a broad church, to employ an entertaining metaphor. |
14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: By 'law of nature' or 'natural law' I mean a generalization describing a regularity, not some metaphysical entity that produces or is responsible for that regularity. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1 n1) | |
A reaction: I take the second version to be a relic of a religious world view, and having no place in a naturalistic metaphysic. The regularity view is then the only player in the field, and the question is, can we do more? Can't we explain regularities? |