9 ideas
| 13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Grice argued that the truth-functional account of conditionals can withstand objections, provided that we are careful to distinguish the false from the misleadingly true. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? 2 |
| 8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
| Full Idea: According to Grice, it is the rules that govern conversation beyond the merely logical that account for the counter-intuitiveness of the truth table for the material conditional. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 8.I | |
| A reaction: There is a conversational rule which says that replies should normally relevant to context. It would be nice if logical implications were also relevant to context. |
| 13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
| Full Idea: Grice defended the truth-functional account of conditionals, noting the gap between what we are justified in believing and what is appropriate to say. .But the problem arises at the level of belief, not at the level of inappropriate conversational remarks | |
| From: comment on H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.1.3 |
| 14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Grice drew attention to situations in which a person is justified in believing a proposition, which would nevertheless by an unreasonable thing for the person to say, in normal circumstances. I think he is right about disjunction and negated conjunctions. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 2.4 | |
| A reaction: Edgington considers Grice's ideas of implicature as of permanent value, especially as a clarification of 1950s ordinary language philosophy. |
| 16618 | Intellectual and moral states, and even the soul itself, depend on prime matter for their existence [Blasius, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Blasius argued that prime matter is the subject of all our intellectual and moral states. This implies that such states cannot exist apart from the body, which seems to imply further that the soul itself cannot exist apart from the body. | |
| From: report of Blasius of Parma (Les quaestiones de anima (lectures on the soul) [1385], I.8 p.65) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.3 | |
| A reaction: It seems that, under pressure, Blasius recanted this view in lectures given eleven years later. |
| 20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
| Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold. | |
| From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well. |
| 20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
| Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood). | |
| From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
| A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that. |
| 20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
| Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it. | |
| From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
| A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing. |
| 20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
| Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music. | |
| From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
| A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art! |