10 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: We must allow ordinary speech to use inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. We speak of digging a well or weaving a cloak, but there is no well or cloak when they are being dug or woven. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.129) | |
A reaction: Nice examples. The imprecision is reduced if I say I am creating a well, because that implies something that is not yet complete. If I say I intend to dig a well, is that imprecise because the well does not exist? |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong - as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to perceive Body. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.270) | |
A reaction: For the opposite case he suggests a man running, talking or sleeping. He doesn't mention essential natures, but this is clearly correct. We might say that they are properties which need to be mentioned in a full definition. |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.042) | |
A reaction: This may be correct of someone who is insane, but seems unfair to the fool and the infant. At what age do children begin to know things? If speech was just random nonsense, an accidental truth seems impossible. |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.062) | |
A reaction: It is hard to conceive of an genuinely insane person deliberately misreporting their hallucinations. They are, of course, the sole witness. |
6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Davidson observes that the inference from a thought being identified by a relation to something outside the head does not entail that the thought is not wholly in the head, just as sunburn is identified by external factors, but is still in the skin. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Knowing One's Own Mind [1987]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.8 | |
A reaction: Rowlands (an externalist) agrees, and this strikes me as correct, and it needs to be one of the fixed points in any assessment of externalism. |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: He who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.058) | |
A reaction: This precisely David Hume's empiricist account of the formation of concepts. Hume's example is a golden mountain, which he got from Aquinas. How do we dream of faces we have never encountered, or shapes we have never seen? |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well. |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood). | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that. |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art! |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing. |