Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Croce and Collingwood', 'Knowing One's Own Mind' and 'The Philosophical Culture'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is now dominated by a spirit of theory construction which sees philosophy as continuous with science, but the other problem-centred style is still in existence and it is important to keep it alive.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The Philosophical Culture [1995], §6)
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
     Full Idea: Davidson observes that the inference from a thought being identified by a relation to something outside the head does not entail that the thought is not wholly in the head, just as sunburn is identified by external factors, but is still in the skin.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Knowing One's Own Mind [1987]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.8
     A reaction: Rowlands (an externalist) agrees, and this strikes me as correct, and it needs to be one of the fixed points in any assessment of externalism.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
     Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
     Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood).
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that.
We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
     Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing.
The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]
     Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art!