8 ideas
21717 | Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions [Quine, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Quine charges that the axiom of Reducibility both undoes the effect of the ramification, and commits the theory to a platonist view of propositional functions (which is a theory of sets, once use/mention confusions are cleared up). | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Set Theory and its Logic [1963], p.249-58) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1 |
17423 | The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha] |
Full Idea: What is really essential to being a natural number is what is common to the natural numbers in all the functions they perform. | |
From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 2) | |
A reaction: I could try using natural numbers as insults. 'You despicable seven!' 'How dare you!' I actually agree. The question about functions is always 'what is it about this thing that enables it to perform this function'. |
17425 | To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha] |
Full Idea: A knowledge of 'how many' cannot be inferred from the equinumerosity of two collections; a numerical quantifier statement is needed. | |
From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 3) |
17424 | Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha] |
Full Idea: Counting is the activity of putting an initial segment of a serially ordered string in 1-1 correspondence with some other collection of entities. | |
From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 2) |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well. |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art! |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood). | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that. |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing. |