22 ideas
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy; their world shrinks to one in which it takes centre stage. | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p.10) | |
A reaction: A wonderfully accurate observation, I'm afraid. You can trace the entire history of the subject as a wave of obsessions with exciting new ideas. Fine is referring to a posteriori necessities and possible worlds. |
12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: On saying that a particular number exists, we are not saying that there is something identical to it, but saying something about its status as a genuine constituent of the world. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.168) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Frege's criterion of identity, which is to be an element in an identity relation, such as x = y. Fine suggests that this only gives a 'trivial' notion of existence, when he is interested in a 'thick' sense of 'exists'. |
12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is not implausible that before the 'introduction' of complex numbers, it would have been incorrect for mathematicians to claim that there was a solution to the equation 'x^2 = -1' under a completely unrestricted understanding of 'there are'. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009]) | |
A reaction: I have adopted this as the crucial test question for anyone's attitude to platonism in mathematics. I take it as obvious that complex numbers were simply invented so that such equations could be dealt with. They weren't 'discovered'! |
12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Arguments such as the dispensability argument are attempting to show something about the essentially non-numerical character of physical reality, rather than something about the nature or non-existence of the numbers themselves. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.160) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Hartry Field. If Quine was right, and we only believe in numbers because of our science, and then Field shows our science doesn't need it, then Fine would be wrong. Quine must be wrong, as well as Field. |
12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The most natural reading of 'electrons exist' is that there are electrons while, on our view, the proper reading should be modeled on 'electrons spin', meaning every electron spins. 'Exists' should be treated as a predicate rather than a quantifier. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.167) | |
A reaction: So existence IS a predicate (message to Kant). Dunno. Electrons have to exist in order to spin, but they don't have to exist in order to exist. But they don't have to exist to be 'dead'. |
12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Just as one can extend the domain of discourse to include solutions to the equation 'x^2=-1' so one can extend the domain of discourse to include objects that satisfy the condition 'x is the sum of the G's' or 'x is a temporal part of the object b at t'. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.164) | |
A reaction: This thought lies behind Fine's 'Proceduralism'. I take it that our collection of abstracta consists entirely of items we have either deliberately or unthinkingly 'introduced' into our discourse when they seemed useful. They then submit to certain laws. |
12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The real objects are the objects of reality, those that figure in the facts by which reality is constituted. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.172) | |
A reaction: And these need to be facts over and above the basic facts. Thus, does the 'equator' constitute reality, over and above the Earth being a rotating sphere? Does 'six' constitute reality, over and above all the possible groups of six objects? |
12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Being the case in reality and being fundamental are not sufficient for one another. If one agrees with Thales that the world is composed of water, and with Aristotle that water is indefinitely divisible, then water would be real but not fundamental. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.174) | |
A reaction: Presumably the divisibility would make a reductionist account of water possible. The Atlantic Ocean is real, but water molecules would have a more prominent place in the ontology of any good metaphysician. |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If it is in the nature of a possible object to be abstract, this is presumably a property it has in any possible circumstance in which it is actual. If it is actual it is also concrete. So the property of being abstract and concrete are not incompatible. | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p.14) | |
A reaction: A rather startling and powerful idea. What of the definition of an abstract object as one which is not in space-time, and lacks causal powers? Could it be that abstraction is a projection of our minds, onto concepts or objects? |
12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We need to straddle both of Carnap's internal and external views. It is only by standing outside of reality that we are able to occupy a standpoint from which the constitution of reality can be adequately described. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.174) | |
A reaction: See Idea 4840! I thoroughly approve of this idea, which almost amounts to a Credo for the modern metaphysician. Since we can think outside our room, or our country, or our era, or our solar system, I think we can do what Fine is demanding. |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: By challenging the assumption that reality is 'absolute' (not relative to a standpoint), or that reality is 'coherent' (it is of a piece, from one standpoint), one accepts worldly facts without a privilege standpoint. I call this 'non-standard' realism. | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p.15) | |
A reaction: Fine's essay 'Tense and Reality' explores his proposal. I'm not drawn to either of his challenges. I have always taken as articles of faith that there could be a God's Eye view of all of reality, and that everything coheres, independent of our view. |
12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I suggest we give up on the account of ontological claims in terms of existential quantification. The commitment to the integers is not an existential but a universal commitment, to each of the integers, not to some integer or other. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.167) | |
A reaction: In classical logic it is only the existential quantifier which requires the domain to be populated, so Fine is more or less giving up on classical logic as a tool for doing ontology (apparently?). |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We normally think of logical form as exclusively an attribute of sentences; however, the notion may also be taken to have application to objects. | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p. 3) | |
A reaction: A striking proposal which seems intuitively right. If one said that objects have 'powers', one might subsume abstract and physical objects under a single account. |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The failure to distinguish between the identity or essence of an object and its necessary features is an instance of what we may call 'modal mania'. | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p. 9) | |
A reaction: He blames Kripke's work for modal mania, a reaction to Quine's 'contempt' for modal notions. I don't actually understand Fine's remark (yet), but it strikes me as incredibly important! Explanations by email, please. |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There are three basic forms of necessity - the metaphysical (sourced in the identity of objects); natural necessity (in the 'fabric' of the universe); and normative necessity (in the realm of norms and values). | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p. 7) | |
A reaction: Earlier he has allowed, as less 'basic', logical necessity (in logical forms), and analytic necessity (in meaning). Fine insists that the three kinds should be kept separate (so no metaphysical necessities about nature). I resent this. |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There are two fundamental ways in which a property may be metaphysically necessary: it may be a worldly necessity, true whatever the circumstances; or it may be a transcendent necessity, true regardless of the circumstances. | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p.10) | |
A reaction: [See Fine's 'Necessity and Non-Existence' for further details] The distinction seems to be that the first sort needs some circumstances (e.g. a physical world?), whereas the second sort doesn't (logical relations?). He also applies it to existence. |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Empiricists have always been suspicious of modal notions: the world is an on-or-off matter - either something happens or it does not. ..Empiricists, in so far as they have been able to make sense of modality, have tended to see it as a form of regularity. | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p. 1) | |
A reaction: Fine is discussing the two extreme views of Quine and Lewis. It is one thing to have views about what is possible, and another to include possibilities 'in your ontology'. Our imagination competes with our extrapolations from actuality. |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The content of a sentence is often identified with the set of possible worlds in which it is true, where the worlds are metaphysically possible. But this has the awkward consequence that all metaphysically necessary truths will have the same content. | |
From: Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p.10) | |
A reaction: I've never understood how the content of a sentence could be a vast set of worlds, so I am delighted to see this proposal be torpedoed. That doesn't mean that truth conditions across possible worlds is not a promising notion. |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well. |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood). | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that. |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art! |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing. |