15 ideas
| 16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The new discovery was that with a suitable structure imposed on the space of possible worlds, the Leibnizian idea would work for all modal logics. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1) |
| 16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: If T is only possible if S obtains, and S is possible but doesn't obtain, then T is only possible in the world where S obtains, but T is not possible in the actual world. It follows that the relation of relative possibility is not transitive. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: If T is only possible if S obtains, T and S hold in the actual world, and S does not obtain in world v possible relative to the actual world, then the actual is not possible relative to v, since T holds in the actual. Accessibility can't be symmetrical. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 1) |
| 16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: If some world is 'a way the world might be considered to be if things were different in a certain respect', that might show that the accessibility relation should not be taken to be transitive, and we should have to adopt modal logic T. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8) | |
| A reaction: He has already rejected symmetry from the relation, for reasons concerning relative identity. He is torn between T and S4, but rejects S5, and opts not to discuss it. |
| 16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In S4 logic the actual world is, in itself, special, not just from our point of view. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8) | |
| A reaction: S4 lacks symmetricality, so 'you can get there, but you can't get back', which makes the starting point special. So if you think the actual world has a special place in modal metaphysics, you must reject S5? |
| 16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The equation of a possible world with the way that the (actual) world might be is wrong: the way a distant world might be is not a way the world might be, but a way we might allow it to be given how some intervening world might be. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8) | |
| A reaction: The point here is that a system of possible worlds must include relative possibilities as well as actual possibilities. Dummett argues against S5 modal logic, which makes them all equal. Things impossible here might become possible. Nice. |
| 16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: If our space of possible worlds has no structure, as in the semantics for S5, then, from the standpoint of the semantics, all possible worlds are on the same footing; it then becomes difficult to resist the claim that all are equally real. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 8) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather startling and interesting claim, given that modern philosophy seems full of thinkers who both espouse S5 for metaphysics, and also deny Lewisian realism about possible worlds. I'll ponder that one. Must read the new Williamson…. |
| 10356 | Relativism can be seen as about the rationality of different cultural traditions [MacIntyre, by Kusch] |
| Full Idea: MacIntyre formulates relativism in terms of rationality rather than truth or objectivity. Things are rational relative to some particular tradition, but not rational as such. | |
| From: report of Alasdair MacIntyre (Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [1988], p.352) by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.19 | |
| A reaction: Personally I had always taken it to be about truth, and I expect any account of rationality to be founded on a notion of truth. There can clearly be cultural traditions of evidence, and possibly even of logic (though I doubt it). |
| 20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
| Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold. | |
| From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well. |
| 20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
| Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood). | |
| From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
| A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that. |
| 20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
| Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music. | |
| From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
| A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art! |
| 20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
| Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it. | |
| From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
| A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing. |
| 16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: It cannot be explained what it is for a person to be generous without first explaining what it is for an action to be generous. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 4) | |
| A reaction: I presume a slot machine can't be 'generous', even if it favours the punter, so you can't specify a generous action without making reference to the person. A benign circle, as Aristotle says. |
| 23080 | Liberals debate how conservative or radical to be, but don't question their basics [MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: Contemporary debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively between conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals. There is little place for the criticism of the system itself. | |
| From: Alasdair MacIntyre (Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [1988]), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 01 | |
| A reaction: [No page number given] Kekes seems to be more authoritarian, and MacIntyre is a communitarian (which can be rather authoritarian). I'm dubious about both. |
| 16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In my view, Kripke's promotion of 'natural kinds', coverning chemical substances and animal and plant species, is unfortunate, since these are rather different types of things, and words used for them behave differently. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 2) | |
| A reaction: My view is that the only significant difference among natural kinds is their degree of stability in character. Presumably particles, elements and particular molecules are fairly invariant, but living things evolve. |