Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Croce and Collingwood', 'works' and 'On Wisdom'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Wisdom is a perfect knowledge of the principles of all the sciences and of the art of applying them.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 0)
     A reaction: 'Sciences' should be understood fairly broadly here (e.g. of architecture, agriculture, grammar). This is a scholar's vision of wisdom, very different from the notion of the wisest person in a village full of illiterate people.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The mark of perfect knowledge is that nothing appears in the thing under consideration which cannot be accounted for, and that nothing is encountered whose occurrence cannot be predicted in advance.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 1)
     A reaction: I would track both of these back to the concept of perfect understanding, which is admittedly a bit vague. Does a finite mind need to predict every speck of dust to have perfect knowledge? Do we have perfect knowledge of triangles?
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
     Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
     Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood).
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that.
The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]
     Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art!
We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
     Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it.
     From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
     A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Ideology is 'socially necessary illusion' or 'socially necessary false-consciousness' [Adorno, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: Adorno defines ideology as 'socially necessary illusion' or 'socially necessary false-consciousness' (and the young Habermas accepted something like this definition).
     From: report of Theodor W. Adorno (works [1955]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.1:11
     A reaction: The marxism seems to reside in the view that such things are always 'false'. If they gradually became 'true', would they cease to be ideology? Is it impossible for widespread beliefs to be 'true'?