Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematics without Numbers', 'The Laws of Thought' and 'Letter to Weber'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

8 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic

8083	Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin]
	Full Idea: Boole proposed to use the entire apparatus of a school algebra class, with operations such as addition and multiplication, methods to solve equations, and the like, to produce an algebra of thought.
	From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.3
	A reaction: The Stoics didn’t use any algebraic notation for their study of propositions, so Boole's idea launched full blown propositional logic, and the rest of modern logic followed. Nice one.

7727	Boole's notation can represent syllogisms and propositional arguments, but not both at once [Boole, by Weiner]
	Full Idea: Boole introduced a new symbolic notation in which it was possible to represent both syllogisms and propositional arguments, ...but not both at once.
	From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854], Ch.3) by Joan Weiner - Frege
	A reaction: How important is the development of symbolic notations for the advancement of civilisations? Is there a perfect notation, as used in logical heaven?

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic

8686	Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend]
	Full Idea: Boole (followed by Frege) began to turn logic from a branch of philosophy into a branch of mathematics. He brought an algebraic approach to propositions, and introduced the notion of a quantifier and a type of probabilistic reasoning.
	From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854], 3.2) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics
	A reaction: The result was that logic not only became more mathematical, but also more specialised. We now have two types of philosopher, those steeped in mathematical logic and the rest. They don't always sing from the same songsheet.

5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof

22277	Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter]
	Full Idea: Boole's work was an early example of the axiomatic method, whereby intellectual economy is achieved by studying a set of axioms in which the primitive terms have multiple interpretations.
	From: report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Boole'
	A reaction: Unclear about this. I suppose the axioms are just syntactic, and a range of semantic interpretations can be applied. Are De Morgan's Laws interpretations, or implications of the syntactic axioms? The latter, I think.

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts

18244	I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind]
	Full Idea: Of my theory of irrationals you say that the irrational number is nothing else than the cut itself, whereas I prefer to create something new (different from the cut), which corresponds to the cut. We have the right to claim such a creative power.
	From: Richard Dedekind (Letter to Weber [1888], 1888 Jan), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 5.4
	A reaction: Clearly a cut will not locate a unique irrational number, so something more needs to be done. Shapiro remarks here that for Dedekind numbers are objects.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism

8698	Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend]
	Full Idea: The modal structuralist thinks of mathematical structures as possibilities. The application of mathematics is just the realisation that a possible structure is actualised. As structures are possibilities, realist ontological problems are avoided.
	From: report of Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 4.3
	A reaction: Friend criticises this and rejects it, but it is appealing. Mathematics should aim to be applicable to any possible world, and not just the actual one. However, does the actual world 'actualise a mathematical structure'?

9557	Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara]
	Full Idea: Hellman represents statements of pure mathematics as elliptical for modal conditionals of a certain sort.
	From: report of Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 5.3
	A reaction: It's a pity there is such difficulty in understanding conditionals (see Graham Priest on the subject). I intuit a grain of truth in this, though I take maths to reflect the structure of the actual world (with possibilities being part of that world).

10263	Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman]
	Full Idea: The usual way to show that a sentence is possible is to show that it has a model, but for Hellman presumably a sentence is possible if it might have a model (or if, possibly, it has a model). It is not clear what this move brings us.
	From: comment on Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.3
	A reaction: I can't assess this, but presumably the possibility of the model must be demonstrated in some way. Aren't all models merely possible, because they are based on axioms, which seem to be no more than possibilities?