21757
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Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
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Full Idea:
Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
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A reaction:
This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?
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6855
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Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
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Full Idea:
Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
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From:
Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
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A reaction:
I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.
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6856
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Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
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Full Idea:
Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
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From:
Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
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A reaction:
Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
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15282
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Facts should be deducible from the theory and initial conditions, and prefer the simpler theory [Osiander, by Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The two positivist criteria for a scientific theory are that the facts must be deducible from the theory together with initial conditions, and if there is more than one theory the simplest must be chosen.
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From:
report of Andreas Osiander (Preface to 'De Revolutionibus' [1543]) by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 7.I
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A reaction:
Harré and Madden cite this as a famous early statement of positivism. It seems to combine Hempel and Lewis very concisely. Wrong, of course. It does not, though, appear to mention 'laws'.
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