Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', '17: Epistle to Titus' and 'Aristotle on Matter'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

21757	Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
	Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
	A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition

12302	Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4)
	A reaction: I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end?

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia

14266	Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: For us, sets constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm. But for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1 n4)
	A reaction: Genus and differentia are only part of the story in Aristotle, and this remarks strikes me as perceptive. It is precisely the mapping of the explanatory hierarchy which Aristotle seeks in a good definition.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

9464	One of their own prophets said that Cretans are always liars [Anon (Titus)]
	Full Idea: One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, the Cretians are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies. This witness is true.
	From: Anon (Titus) (17: Epistle to Titus [c.115], I.12)
	A reaction: The classic statement of the paradox, the word 'always' being the source of the problem.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

14268	Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It may be that the two forms of grounding have a different source; the one from the bottom up is required for the constitution of the thing to be intelligible; the one from the top down is required for the essence of the thing to be intelligible.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 2)
	A reaction: [He cites Aristotle Met. 1019a8-10 in support] Close reading of Fine would be needed to elucidate this properly, but it is a suggestive line of thought about how we should approach grounding.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

14267	There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach.

14264	Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter

14265	The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If one considers Aristotle's standard example of a definition, then it is plausible that its defining terms ('plane figure' in the case of a circle) should be constitutive of it in the same general way as physical matter constitutes something physical.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: It strikes me that an appropriate translation for the Greek 'hule' might be the English 'ingredients', since Fine seems to be right about the broad application of hule in Aristotle.